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Abstract 
Textbook models predict that a fall in profit tax by one country would increase 
multinational (MNC) investment in that country. This thesis shows theoretically and 
empirically that the reverse can be true when the MNC uses transfer pricing to shift 
profits to a tax haven. 
An MNC can tunnel profits out of high-tax jurisdictions by manipulating the transfer 
prices at which it books transactions amongst its subsidiaries. It can allocate 
production across its subsidiaries to minimize global production costs, and allocate 
sales to maximize global sales revenue, then use transfer pricing to shift the profits to 
tax havens. Thus, a tax cut might fail to attract investment from an MNC that exploits 
transfer pricing. I show that the tax cut would actually reduce its investment if it 
exports from the host country at a transfer price that is lower than its marginal cost of 
production. 
The empirical part of this thesis examines the theoretical prediction that U.S. 
multinationals will reduce the production in that country even after corporate tax rate 



















Most people are influenced by great thinkers. I am not an exception. 
During my writing of this thesis, I am so lucky to be taught and influenced by the 
three great thinkers: Professor Leslie Young, Professor Junsen Zhang and Professor 
Yun-Wing Sung. I would like to give my whole-hearted and deepest thanks to Prof. 
Young - without his extraordinary ideas, thought-provocative instructions, and 
dedicated guidance; this thesis would not come into form. I am indebted and cherish 
the time of learning from him. I would especially love to thank Prof. Zhang so much 
for his committed supervision during my master's studies and invaluable advices on 
my thesis writing. He has provided detailed, in-depth and constructive comments on 
many aspects of this thesis, and the very effort of his enhances the thesis up to this 
standard. I am also very thankful for Prof. Sung's unreserved suggestions, intriguing 
instructions and data provision which are so important to this thesis. 
Many thanks also go to my classmates, Yi Junjian, He Qing, Zhang Ning, Zhou 
Shaojie, Xiong Yanyan, Ye Maoliang and Han Jun. The discussions with them have 
been greatly helpful to the progress of the empirical part of this thesis. 
I owe so much to my parents, especially to my father, who always trusts and loves me. 
He passed away during the time while I was writing this thesis. Sorrow and 
depression did not beat me because God has been with me and comforting me. This 
thesis is for my biological father and my heavenly father God. I appreciate the 
supports from my brothers and sisters in the mandarin fellowship at CUHK, which 
help me get through many difficulties during my thesis writing period. 
My wife, Yanjie, loves, trusts and encourages me all the time, without whom I would 
not still be on the road of pursuing the academic career. Especially during the last 
month of my writing this thesis, her time-consuming correction and editing job make 
this thesis completed more smoothly and quickly. Nothing can express my gratitude to 
her. 
iii 
Table of Content 
Abstract i 
Acknowledgement iii 
Table of Content iv 
Chapter 1 Introduction 1 
1.1 "Race to the bottom" 1 
1.2 The New Context of International Trade- 2 
1.3 Related party trade of Hong Kong 4 
1.4 Transfer Pricing 6 
Chapter 2 The Theory 9 
2.1 Introduction 9 
2.2 Literature Review 10 
2.3 The Model 16 
2.4 MNC Manipulation Of Transfer Pricing 20 
2.5 MNC Manipulation Of Host Country Demand 25 
2.6 MNC Manipulation Of Explicit Benchmarks On Transfer Prices 28 
2.7 The Race to the Bottom in International Tax Competition 32 
2.8 Textbook Model without Transfer Pricing 35 
2.9 Concluding Remarks 37 
Chapter 3 Empirical Evidence 39 
3.1 Introduction 39 
3.2 Related Literature 41 
3.3 Data and Empirical Specification 44 
3.4 Empirical Results 51 
Appendix - 58 
List of Tables 63 
Table 1 Related Party Trade as a Share of U.S. Imports from Selected Countries and 
Regions 63 
Table 2 Related Party Trade as a Share of U.S. Exports from Selected Countries and 
Regions —63 
i v 
Table 3 A Top 10 Source Countries for Re-exports via Hong Kong, 2006 64 
Table 3B: Top 10 Destinations of Re-exports via Hong Kong, 2006 64 
Table 4A: Top 10 sources of China's FDI in 2005- 64 
Table 4B: Top 10 sources of China's FDI in 2006 64 
Table 4C Top 10 sources of China's FDI (January to March 2007) 64 
Table 5 Round Tripping of FDI to the PRC: The Case of U.S. 65 
Table 6 Top 24 Destinations for FDI in 2005 65 
Table 7 Percentage of foreign firms reporting losses in the PRC- 65 
Table 8 43 Countries by region 66 
Table 9 Gross Foreign Productions of U.S. Multinationals by Country from 1997 to 
2004 66 
Table 10 Tax Rates by Country from 1997 to 2004 67 
Table 11 Original Corruption Index by country from 1997 to 2004 68 
Table 12 U.S. MNCs' Internal Trade Ratio by country from 1997 to 2004 69 
Table 13 - OLS Regression of Foreign Productions on Present Tax Rates 70 
Table 14 - OLS Regression of Foreign Productions on Present Tax Rates 71 
Table 15 OLS Regression of Foreign Productions on One-Year-Lag Tax Rate 71 
Table 16 OLS Regression of Foreign Productions on One-Year-Before Tax Rate 72 
Table 17 OLS Regression of Foreign Productions on Corruption A and B 72 
Table 18 OLS Regression of Foreign Productions on Corruption B and C 73 
Table 19 OLS Regression of Tax Rate on Country Dummies 74 
Bibliography 76 
V 
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 "Race to the bottom，， 
Recent years have seen fast declines in international rates of corporate tax'; as capital 
has become internationally mobile, governments seeking to stimulate domestic 
growth and employment have raced to lower their rates of corporate taxation in order 
to attract investment by multinational corporations (MNCs). That would indeed 
happen within the textbook models of international trade, wherein capital is allocated 
internationally by atomistic firms that maximize after-tax rates of return. However, 
the bulk of international trade today takes place within MNCs, i.e., between 
subsidiaries located in different jurisdictions. Profits can be tunneled out of high-tax 
jurisdictions by transfer pricing that manipulates the prices at which the MNC books 
"me2me" transactions amongst its subsidiaries. MNCs can therefore allocate 
production across their subsidiaries to minimize global production costs, allocate 
sales internationally to maximize global sales revenue, and then use transfer pricing 
to shift the profits from high- to low-tax jurisdictions. Thus, a reduction in corporate 
tax might fail to attract investment from MNCs that can exploit transfer pricing. I 
confirm that this would be true if the multinational corporation (MNC) exports goods 
from a country at a transfer price that is lower than its marginal cost of production 
1 KPMG's 2007 Corporate Tax Rate Survey reports that over the period 1993-2006. The mean EU 
corporate tax rate fell from 38 percent to 25.8 percent. Germany's rate dropped 21.4 percentage points, 
or 36 percent; Italy's dropped 14.9 points or 28.5 percent; Japan's rate dropped 11.9 points, or 22.7 
percent; Canada's rate dropped 8.2 points, or 18.5 percent; The United Kingdom's rate dropped 3 
points, or 9.1 percent. Ireland cut its rate from 40 percent in 1993 down to 12.5 percent in 2006. 
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there. 
However, an MNC faces political and administrative constraints on transfer pricing. 
For example, it invites scrutiny from tax auditors if it books exports from a 
jurisdiction at a price lower than the average cost of production of its subsidiary there, 
or if it books imports into a jurisdiction at a price higher than the average cost of 
production of its subsidiary there. I consider the impact of changes in tax rates on a 
MNC's allocation of production across its subsidiaries when its transfer pricing is 
subject to such political constraints. A tax reduction by a country can lead the MNC 
to reduce production there in order to lower the unit production costs of its local 
subsidiary; this enables it to lower the price of exports to the tax haven, and tunnel 
out more profits. I show that this can be true under some reasonable assumptions. 
The theoretical result is relevant to the current international "race to the bottom" of 
taxes on capital. 
The empirical part of this thesis would seek to examine the possibility that U.S. 
MNCs might want to invest less in a country that exercises a lower tax rate. By using 
time series data, this part also seek to test the prediction that U.S. MNCs will reduce 
the production in that country even after the corporate tax rate of that country falls 
because they can use transfer pricing to maximize their profit internationally 
1.2 The New Context of International Trade 
The traditional theory of international trade developed by David Ricardo and by Eli 
Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin focused on trade in final products and presumed that 
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firms had no market power. Their generic example was the exchange of wine for 
cloth between Portugal and England. The importance of oligopoly in international 
trade was emphasized by the "new" trade theory of James Brander, Barbara Spencer 
and Paul Krugman . Their generic example was the Boeing-Airbus duopoly. The 
generic example of the trade considered in this paper is internal trade that amongst (i) 
subsidiaries of IBM and (ii) Chinese corporate groups with members registered in 
China, Caribbean tax havens, Hong Kong and the US. It is easy to document case (i) 
since classic "multinational corporations" like IBM are publicly listed and therefore 
must disclose their relationships to their subsidiaries. ^ In case (ii), the related 
companies make considerable efforts to conceal their relationship and I can only cite 
indirect evidence. 
The US Commerce Department's Bureau of Economic Analysis collects and 
analyzes data on "related party trade" which includes trade by US companies with 
their subsidiaries abroad as well as trade by US subsidiaries of foreign companies 
with their parent companies. In 2005, related party trade accounted for 47 percent 
($776 billion) of imports and 31 percent ($283 billion) of exports. These percentages 
are consistent with past U.S. performance. Since 1992, related party trade has been 
stable as a share of total US imports and exports goods, varying from 45 to 48 
percent of imports and 31 to 32 percent of exports. However, changes are apparent in 
2 
Summarized in Helpman and Krugman (1985). 
q 
Previous research on MNCs includes: Horst (1971), Batra and Ramachandran (1980)，Helpman 
(1984). 
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the international composition (see Tables 1 and 2). For example, related party trade 
accounts for increasing shares of US trade with Pacific Rim Regions or Countries 
such as Taiwan, China and Korea. However, even these figures may understate the 
extent of the phenomenon because of the obscure ownership of Chinese companies. 
1.3 Related party trade of Hong Kong 
I next provide indirect evidence of the related party trade from Hong Kong. The 
enormous volume of goods re-exported through Hong Kong is reported in Table 3. In 
2006, 19.33% of China's exports were re-exported through HK.4 The following is 
Y.W. Sung's (2006) account: “In HK's investment in export-processing activities of 
mainland, the mainland partners of HK firms process raw materials and 
semi-manufactures supplied by the HK parent, and the processing output is sold via 
the parent to the world market, usually in the form of HK imports from the Mainland 
for re-exports to third economies. Such trade is called OP (Outward-Processing) 
trade in HK. In re-exporting, HK adds value to the goods exported by other 
economies to HK for re-export. The rate of gross margin is much higher for re-export 
of mainland goods than for re-exports of other goods. This is because the bulk of 
HK's re-exports of mainland goods involve outward processing, and HK investors 
engage in many value-adding activities in outward processing. Part of HK's 
re-exports of Mainland goods is 'pure re-exports' that do not involve 
outward-processing. But outward processing part accounted for around 80% or more 
'*http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hong kong—statistics/statistical—tables/index (Exchange rate re-calculated) 
and Customs of P. R. China http://wwwl.customs.gov.cn 
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of HK's re-export of Mainland origin since 1993." 
The Hong Kong data does not identify re-exports that are amongst related parties, a 
difficult task when controlling shareholders cannot be traced. Indirect evidence on 
this can be found in the data on foreign direct investment (FDI) into China in Table 4. 
This conforms to the OECD convention that FDI takes place when a foreign investor 
controls at least 10 per cent of the ordinary shares or the voting power of an 
enterprise.5 FDI is typically undertaken by a company, so the very act of "foreign 
direct investment" sees one company taking a controlling interest in another 
company, i.e., it establishes the basis for related party trade. 
Table 4 shows that more than half the investment into China is from the tax havens 
of Hong Kong, British Virgin Islands, Caymans and Bermuda; the percentage seems 
to be rising. (In 2005, the top 6 destinations of China's outward FDI in 2005 were 
Hong Kong, Korea, Cayman Islands, Canada, Australia and USA.) 
The World Bank (2002) has calculated that 25 percent of the investment in China is 
"round tripping" i.e., Chinese entities shifted capital abroad then reinvested it into 
China. Geng Xiao (2004) has estimated much higher values from discrepancies in the 
data on the FDI from US to PRC between that reported by the US (Row A of table 5) 
and by China (Row B of table 5). Row C of table 5 calculates (B-A)/B，i.e., the 
percentage of FDI into China that purports to be from the US but in fact was never 
recorded as such by the US. This study suggests that 5/6 of the "US" investment 
5 "OECD benchmark definition of foreign direct investment", third edition 1999 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/16/2090148 
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recorded by China is in fact Chinese capital on a round trip. Such round tripping of 
course opens up many opportunities for related party trade. 
Indirect evidence on related party trade around the world can be found in the 
UNCTAD data on FDI that is reproduced in Table 6. Hong Kong hosts more FDI 
than Canada or Germany, and almost half as much as China. Yet, few factories are 
being built in Hong Kong, whose 454 square miles are already packed with 7 million 
people. FDI into Bermuda, the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands also 
totals more than that into Canada or Germany. Yet, factories are as scarce as igloos 
on these Caribbean sand specks. Thus, most of the FDI into these tax havens must 
entail the purchase of a controlling interest in a company. Such FDI creates 
opportunities for trade and transfer pricing among related parties. 
1.4 Transfer Pricing 
Trade within MNCs allows transfer pricing. In a research commissioned by the U.S. 
Internal Revenue Service, Christian and Schultz (2005), estimate that MNCs are 
shifting $87 billion of pre-tax income out of the U.S. each year - net of income 
shifted into the country. Among 686 firms shifting income out of the U.S., they found 
that, on average, foreign return on assets was 11.3 percent compared to domestic 
return on assets of 2.4 percent. For those companies, average foreign effective tax 
rates were 22.2 percent compared to U.S. tax rates of 32.9 percent. 
Pak and Zdanowicz (2002) studied U.S. import and export data produced by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce and contained in the U.S. merchandise trade database, the 
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same data used to determine the U.S. balance of trade. They determined that MNCs 
used transfer pricing to avoid $53.1 billion in taxes during 2001，$44.6 billion in 
2000, $42.7 billion in 1999 and $35.7 billion in 1998. US corporations imported 
from their foreign subsidiaries tweezers at $4,896, toilet tissue at $4,121.81 per 
kilogram and plastic buckets at $972. U.S. companies exported to their foreign 
subsidiaries missile launchers at $52.03 and prefabricated buildings at $1.20 per unit. 
Martin Sullivan (2004) used U.S. Commerce Department data to infer that U.S. 
corporations have shifted approximately $75 billion a year to foreign subsidiaries. 
Over the last 12 years, foreign profits have more than tripled -- from $89 billion in 
1993 to $298 billion. The domestic share of profits has declined significantly ~ from 
83.6 percent in 1993 to 74.4 percent in June of 2004. Sullivan applies 6.6 percent 
drop in domestic U.S. profits to U.S. annualized profits of $1,166 trillion and comes 
up with an income-shifting estimate of $75 billion. Profits from operations of U.S. 
MNCs in no-tax Bermuda have tripled, from $8.5 billion to $25.2 billion. In low-tax 
Ireland, for instance, profits of subsidiaries of US MNCs have doubled in four years, 
from $13.4 billion to $26.8 billion. Factors reducing the corporate taxes in recent 
years include more tax shelters, new tax breaks, and the transfer of profits by MNCs 
to low-tax foreign nations. Profit-shifting out of the United State to Ireland, cost the 
U.S. Treasury at least $2 billion in 2002 (Sullivan, 2005). 
An indication of the extent of transfer pricing to leave profits in Hong Kong is 
provided by the gross margins earned by Hong Kong-based entities in China trade. In 
2005, they earned margins of 30.7% on goods that were re-exported, but only 11.3% 
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on offshore trade managed by Hong Kong entities, but not passing through the 
territory of Hong Kong (Sung，2006). This suggests that profits are tunnelled into 
Hong Kong at a high rate. Indeed, when so much investment in China comes from 
tax havens, it would be astounding if controlling shareholders failed to exploit the 
situation to shift more profits into tax havens. 
Another perspective on transfer pricing can be found in the losses reported by MNCs 
in China reported in Table 7. The high and rising percentage of firms reporting losses 
over the period 1988-2000 contrasts sharply with the flood of FDI into China over 
the same period. I conjecture that the FDI was attracted by the prospect of high 
profits that could be tunneled out untaxed through transfer pricing. The rising 
percentage of firms reporting losses over the period 1988-2000 probably reflects the 
end of tax holidays that had been granted to foreign investors. From 2000，the 
percentage reporting losses has fallen, perhaps because the PRC government has 
stepped up surveillance. 
Today, China has one of the most sophisticated transfer pricing laws in the world. 
However, the PRC State Administration of Taxation has no more than 20 transfer 
pricing specialists to oversee the operations of 330,000 foreign invested enterprises 
(Chung, 2007). China contends that 60 percent of losses are due to transfer pricing 
abuses. K estimates that it loses 30 billion yuan or US$ 3.9 billion per year in transfer 
pricing abuses. In 2005 it recovered only 400 million from transfer pricing cases. 
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Chapter 2 The Theory 
2.1 Introduction 
Recent years have seen fast declines in international rates of corporate tax; as capital 
has become internationally mobile, governments seeking to stimulate domestic 
growth and employment have raced to lower their rates of corporate taxation in order 
to attract/retain investment by MNCs. However, an MNC can tunnel profits out of 
high-tax jurisdictions by manipulating the transfer prices at which it books 
transactions amongst its subsidiaries. It can allocate production across its subsidiaries 
to minimize global production costs, and allocate sales to maximize global sales 
revenue, then use transfer pricing to shift the profits to tax havens. Thus, a tax cut 
might fail to attract investment from an MNC that exploits transfer pricing. I show 
that the tax cut would actually reduce its investment if it exports from the host 
country at a transfer price that is lower than its marginal cost of production. 
An MNC faces political and administrative constraints on transfer pricing. For 
example, it invites scrutiny from tax auditors if it books exports from a jurisdiction at 
a price lower than the average cost of production of its subsidiary there, or if it books 
imports into a jurisdiction at a price higher than the average cost of production of its 
subsidiary there. Would such benchmarking to control transfer pricing forestall the 
perverse response of MNC investment to tax cuts noted above? On the contrary, such 
benchmarks can ensure a perverse response of investment to tax cuts: the 
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above-stated sufficient condition for a perverse response then follows from the 
first-order conditions for profit maximization by the MNC. 
After the literature review in Section 2.2, Section 2.3 considers a simple static model 
of an MNC that allocates production and sales between a home and a host country 
but can shift profits to a tax haven via transfer pricing. In this model, the effect of tax 
cuts on MNC investment in a country is captured by their effects on the MNC 
production allocated there. Section 2.4 brings out the economic intuition via the 
special case where host country demand is fixed and the MNC views the transfer 
prices as parameters when it chooses production and sales. Section 2.5 allows the 
MNC to manipulate host country demand; Section 2.6 allows the MNC to consider 
the impact of its policies on the benchmarks set by the governments. Section 2.7 
shows that a tax cut by country A can reduce MNC investment in country B，but if 
both cut their tax rates in tandem, then both will suffer a fall in MNC investment. 
There could ensue a confused "race to the bottom" in which each country attributes 
the fall in local MNC investment to the tax cuts of its rival. In fact, B's tax cut tends 
to increase MNC investment in A; the real culprit is A's own tax cut. Section 2.8 
reaffirms the prediction of traditional model without transfer pricing that foreign tax 
rates have negative effects on MNC foreign productions. Section 2.9 situates our 
analysis within broader issues of international economics. 
2.2 Literature Review 
Elitzur and Mintz (1996) have examined transfer pricing and international tax 
competition in the context of a tax setting game between home and host governments. 
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Empirical research on international tax competition can be found in Pain and Young 
(1996)，Avi-Yonah (2000), Benassy-Quere et. al (2001) and Devereux et al. (2002). 
Stewart and Webb (2003) consider alternative measures of the corporate tax burden 
and find little evidence of a competitive "race to the bottom" in capital taxation. 
However, KPMG (2007) reports that over the period 1993-2006, the mean EU 
corporate tax rate fell from 38 percent to 25.8 percent. Large cuts were reported for 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and Ireland. Recently, Bloomberg (May 29，2007) 
reported that the UK, Germany, France and Spain plan further cuts in response to the 
tax competition from East European countries, especially Poland, Slovakia and 
Hungary. 
Will the tax cuts actually attract foreign direct investment (FDI)? Many empirical 
researchers have estimated the elasticity of FDI with respect to the host country's 
corporate tax rate. Their econometric specifications vary widely, as do their selection 
and organization of the data on tax rates and foreign investment, for they must sort 
through many complexities: FDI can be via merger and acquisition or via purchases 
of plants and equipment; it can be financed through retained earnings or transfers 
abroad; tax concessions can take the form of tax holidays, reductions in the corporate 
tax rate, accelerated depreciation and rebates on tariffs, so researchers must impound 
these concessions into an effective marginal tax rate or an average tax rate; a host 
country might give a credit for taxes paid by their foreign subsidiaries (as in the US, 
Japan, UK and Italy), or it might grant a tax exemption on profits earned abroad that 
have already been taxed (as in Germany, the Netherlands, Canada and France); the 
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effects of the tax concessions might be confounded by contemporaneous rises in 
investment through economic growth or exchange rate movements; investment 
surges that anticipate tax changes must be distinguished from long-term adjustments 
to such changes; a given tax concession might offer more benefits to certain 
industries, e.g., accelerated depreciation offers benefits to capital intensive 
industries. 
Most researchers report significantly negative elasticities of investment with respect 
to the corporate tax rate, especially when the investment is measured by aggregate 
financial flows into a particular country (Hartman (1984, 1985)，Boskin and Gale 
(1987)). However, Slemrod (1990)，Cassou (1997)，Jun (1994)，Devereux and 
Freeman (1995)) report that the effects of corporate taxation on bilateral investment 
flows were mostly insignificant. Mooij and Ederveen's (2003) "meta analysis" of this 
literature surveyed 25 authors; 11 reported at least one non-negative elasticity; overall, 
about 1 in 5 of the elasticities reported was non-negative. 
Swenson's (1994) investigation of investment into the US over the 1980s found only 
positive elasticities. That was her expectation in following up Scholes and Wolfson's 
(1990) explanation for the surge of foreign investment into the US that followed the 
1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA). She postulated that investors equate their net return on 
active investments to their net returns on a passive investment 一 which was 
unaffected by TRA. TRA's elimination of tax concessions on depreciation and tax 
credits, etc., lowered the net return on the active investments, which required a rise in 
their gross returns. This would have attracted more investment into the US from 
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foreign corporations that could claim a tax credit at home for their US taxes. 
Swenson found evidence for this at the level of industries when she measured the 
average tax that each industry enjoyed, and controlled for exchange rate movements. 
The ScholesAVolfson/Swenson theory would not apply to firms that have 
accumulated more tax credits than they use. Moreover, even those countries that do 
tax profits earned abroad defer the tax until the profits are repatriated. Tanzi and 
Bovenberg (1990) argue that excess foreign credits and tax deferral make the 
distinction between tax credit and tax exemption systems of little practical 
importance. Altshuler and Newlon (1993) have shown that many US MNCs manage 
their income repatriations so that they face hardly any home-country tax. So the 
positive elasticities estimated by Swenson could reflect other effects — such as the 
effects of transfer pricing studied in this paper. A significantly positive elasticity was 
also reported by Brainard (1997, p. 530) when she tested a model of MNC 
investment that highlighted the tradeoff between scale economies and proximity to 
markets. She explained the positive elasticity thus: "This puzzle may be explained by 
correlation between the tax rate and other macroeconomic variables, such as a public 
investment and income." (p. 539). 
In reviewing these publications, we should recognize that the researchers, editors and 
referees shared a presumption that tax concessions would attract FDI by raising its 
net return, a presumption so strong that researchers typically did not even bother to 
set out its theoretical basis. If their first empirical efforts had yielded positive 
elasticities, then this presumption might well have triggered experiments with the 
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many possible econometric specifications and ways to repackage the data that we 
noted above 一 until most of the estimated elasticities were negative. In any case, the 
strength of the presumption might well have precluded the publication of any 
research that reported mostly positive elasticities of FDI with respect to tax rates, 
absent a convincing theoretical explanation. Swenson alone approached the data with 
a theory that implied a positive elasticity — and found supporting evidence. Brainard 
focused on testing a rich theoretical model of international investment; for her, the 
positive elasticity was a peripheral matter, a curiosum that called for only a 
one-sentence comment. 
The above literature on the effects of corporate taxes on international investment has 
become less relevant to MNC practice as MNCs leam to exploit tax havens to avoid 
most of their tax obligations. This phenomenon has been studied by Hines and Rice 
(1994), Desai and Hines (1999)，Gordon and Hines (2002), Bartelsman and Beetsman 
(2003), Desai et. al. (2004, 2005). Evidence that tax changes affect transfer pricing 
was reported by Jacob (1996), Swenson (2001) and Klausing (2003). The extent to 
which transfer pricing has vitiated corporate taxation was noted by the U.S. General 
Accounting Office (2004) which found that more than 60% of U.S. controlled 
corporations with at least $250 million in assets (representing 93 percent of all 
corporate assets reported to the IRS) reported no federal tax liability each year 
between 1996 and 2000. Those untaxed corporations received $3.5 trillion of 
revenues. 71% of foreign-based firms operating in the U.S. during that period paid no 
U.S. taxes. 
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Christian and Schultz (2005) estimate that MNCs are shifting $87 billion of pre-tax 
income out of the U.S. each year - net of income shifted into the country. Pak and 
Zdanowicz (2002) conclude that MNCs used transfer pricing to avoid $53.1 billion in 
taxes during 2001, $44.6 billion in 2000, $42.7 billion in 1999 and $35.7 billion in 
1998. Sullivan (2004) inferred that U.S.-based MNCs have shifted about $75 billion 
a year to foreign subsidiaries. Over the preceding 12 years, their profits credited to 
foreign jurisdictions more than tripled — from $89 billion in 1993 to $298 billion in 
2004. They surged from $8.5 billion to $25.2 billion in no-tax Bermuda and from 
$13.4 billion to $26.8 billion in low-tax Ireland. 
China, today the largest recipient of MNC investment, is another major victim of 
transfer pricing. Li and Paisley (2007，p. 26) report that "the tax revenue statistics 
show that 35% to 40% of foreign investment enterprises were in a loss-making 
position from 1988 to 1993. For 1994 and 1995，the percentage increased to between 
50% and 60%. Between 1996 and 2000，60% to 70% of foreign companies reported 
losses. The Chinese Government estimates that 60 percent of the reported losses by 
these companies is attributable to transfer pricing maneuvers." The high and rising 
percentage of firms reporting losses over the period 1988-2000 contrasts sharply with 
the flood of FDI into China over the same period. I conjecture that one major 
attraction was the high profits that could be tunneled out untaxed via transfer pricing: 
China's State Administration of Taxation has only 20 transfer pricing specialists to 
oversee 330,000 foreign invested enterprises (Chung, 2007). 
Worldwide, the scope for transfer pricing within MNCs is vast. The US Census 
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Bureau reports that in 2005, related party trade accounted for 47 percent ($776 
billion) of US imports and 31 percent ($283 billion) of US exports. Related party 
trade accounts for increasing shares of US trade with Pacific Rim Regions or 
Countries such as Taiwan, China and Korea. However, even these figures may 
understate the phenomenon, given the obscure ownership of many international 
trading companies. The tax havens of Hong Kong, British Virgin Islands, the 
Caymans and Samoa accounted for 50.18% of investment into China in 2005 and 
55.70% in 2006 and 61.95% in the first quarter of 2007. ^ Much of this is Chinese 
capital on a “round trip" via the tax havens to exploit China's tax concessions to 
foreign enterprises. 
2.3 The Model 
We consider a MNC with subsidiaries in three jurisdictions: the home country, the 
foreign country and a tax haven. The foreign subsidiary has output x and sales y. The 
total cost of producing x units is c(x), so the average cost of production is a(x)= 
c(x)/x. Demand conditions are summarized by the revenue function r(y) from selling 
y units. For example, if the foreign subsidiary faces a perfectly competitive consumer 
market, then r(y) = py where the price p is independent of y. Profits booked in the 
foreign country are taxed at rate t. The corresponding variables for the home 
subsidiary are indicated by the corresponding upper case letters. 
The MNC's exports from the foreign country equal its imports into the home 
6See http://ww.mofcom.gov.en/aarticle/tongiiziliao/v/200704/20070404572808.html. the website of 
China's Ministry of Commerce 
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country: 
Y - X = x - y > 0 
The exports pass through the ownership of a tax haven subsidiary, which might 
undertake repackaging or minimal processing at negligible cost. This provides cover 
for the foreign subsidiary to sell to the tax haven subsidiary at a price q that siphons 
profits into the tax haven, which taxes the profits at a rate k (which might be zero). 
The tax haven subsidiary then on-sells the good to the home subsidiary at a price Q; 
this can also be set to siphon profits from the home country to the tax haven. 
The MNC is headquartered in the home country, which grants a tax exemption for 
profits that have already been taxed abroad. Its world after-tax profits are: 
(1 一 T){R(Y) - C(X) - Q(Y - X)}+ (1 - t){r(y) - c(x) + q(x 一 y)} + (1 - k)(Q -
q)(x - y) 
The first term of this expression is after-tax profits of the home subsidiary, the 
second one is after-tax profits of the foreign subsidiary, and the last term refers to 
after-tax profits of the subsidiary in the tax-haven. Hence, the whole expression 
denotes the MNCs world after-tax profits. 
This expression would remain valid if the home country allows only a tax credit for 
foreign profits, but taxes profits earned abroad only when they are repatriated 
—provided that the MNC defers repatriation using a strategy like those noted by 
Desai et al. (2003)7 Henceforth, we shall assume that t > k and T > k, i.e., the tax 
7 US MNCs hold such a large volume of profits offshore that the US recently tried to encourage their 
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haven's effective tax rate on profits is lower than in either country, so that the MNC 
is motivated to shift profits there by setting transfer prices such that q < Q. It would 
want to set q as low as possible and Q as high as possible. However, patently absurd 
levels might trigger a tax audit and fines for tax fraud. 
A government with a corruptive bureaucracy might seek to deter transfer pricing by 
keeping ambiguous what would trigger an audit, then imposing heavy fines in a few 
high-profile cases. The MNC might guess at the government benchmarks that would 
trigger an audit, but would hesitate to push hard against those benchmarks. In these 
circumstances, the MNC might experiment with transfer prices that it holds steady to 
see whether they will trigger an audit, meantime choosing its outputs and sales 
subject to those levels. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 model this situation by supposing that 
output and sales are chosen to maximize profits, given parametric values of q and Q 
that respect various government benchmarks. 
A government with a clean bureaucracy might seek to promote a transparent business 
environment by making explicit the benchmark that would trigger a tax audit and 
setting penalties at a level high enough to deter violations. In these circumstances, 
the MNC would push its transfer prices hard up against the government benchmark, 
and would take account of how its choices of outputs and sales would affect those 
benchmarks 一 and the transfer prices that it can exploit. This model will be explored 
in Section 2.6. 
repatriation via the 2004 American Jobs Creation Act, which temporarily reduced tax rates on 
repatriations. 
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The benchmarks that a government chooses would depend on its economic 
sophistication and accounting skills. Thus, the foreign government might query a tax 
filing based on a transfer price q for exports to the tax haven that is less than the 
foreign subsidiary's average costs: why would the MNC invest from abroad just to 
lose money? A more economically literate government might benchmark q against 
foreign marginal costs, presuming that a profit-maximizing MNC would increase 
foreign output until the export price just covers its marginal costs. But if that 
government lacked the accounting skills to verify the marginal costs, it might 
nevertheless benchmark the transfer price against average cost. 
Likewise, the home government might query a tax filing based on a transfer price Q 
greater than the price P paid by home consumers: why would the MNC import to sell 
at a loss? A more economically literate home government might benchmark Q 
against home marginal revenue, presuming that a profit-maximizing MNC would 
increase imports until the import price equals marginal revenue. However, to 
estimate the marginal revenue would require estimates of the demand elasticity that 
would be open to legal challenge. Therefore, the home government might benchmark 
the transfer price against cost measures that can be verified from the firm's accounts. 
Thus, it might query a transfer price that is less than the home subsidiary's average 
cost; why import at a price that is higher than the cost of producing it at home? A 
more economically literate home government might benchmark Q against the 
marginal cost of the home subsidiary, presuming that a profit-maximizing MNC 
would import until the import price equals the marginal cost of producing the good at 
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home. But if that government lacked the accounting skills to verify the marginal 
costs, it might nevertheless benchmark the transfer price against average cost. 
In practice, cost-based benchmarks for transfer prices typically add a profit margin, 
estimated from the margins earned by comparable firms; benchmarks based on the 
market price of comparable products typically deduct a profit margin, estimated from 
the margins earned by comparable firms.^ We shall acknowledge these practices by 
postulating government benchmarks that incorporate an exogenously-given profit 
margin. 
2.4 MNC Manipulation Of Transfer Pricing 
We first consider an MNC that chooses outputs and sales, while regarding the 
transfer prices q and Q as parameters. This section further assumes that foreign sales 
are fixed, as would be the case, for example, if the MNC does not sell at all in the 
foreign country, but uses it only as an export platform. This assumption, to be relaxed 
in the next section, allows an intuitive argument that highlights the economic 
intuition. 
As Y = X + X - y, the MNCs objective function is: 
71 = ( 1 - T){R(X + x - y ) - C ( X ) } + (T — k)(x - y)Q + (1 - t){r(y) — c(x)} + ( k - t ) ( x 
-y )q 
The MNCs choices of x and X are determined by the following first-order 
8 Li and Paisey (2007，p. 34 -36) provide a useful review of international practices in benchmarking 
transfer prices for audit purposes. 
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conditions (a subscript indicates differentiation with respect to the corresponding 
variable): 
(1) 0 = 71X = ( R Y - C X ) ( 1 - T ) 
(2) 0 = 7Cx = R Y ( l - T ) - C x ( l - t ) + ( T - k ) Q + (k - t )q 
How does t affect the choices determined by these first-order conditions? t does not 
affect (1), so its impact on foreign output x is determined by its impact on (2). The 
second-order conditions for profit maximization require that tCxx < 0, so the Implicit 
Function Theorem implies that Xt = - Ttxt/兀xx has the sign of Tixt = Cx - q. We have 
proved: 
Lemma 1: Suppose that the MNC views y, q and Q as parameters as it chooses x and 
X. 
Xt > 0 if and only if q < Cx 
i.e., a reduction in the foreign tax t reduces foreign output if and only if the foreign 
subsidiary's marginal cost exceeds the price at which it books exports to the tax 
haven. 
The intuition is as follows. If q < Cx then the marginal unit produced and exported by 
the foreign subsidiary incurs an after-tax loss (l-t)(Cx-q) in the foreign country. At a 
maximum of the MNC's overall after-tax profit, this marginal unit must have zero 
impact on overall after-tax profit. It follows that this marginal foreign output has a 
positive impact on after-tax profits booked elsewhere. A rise in the foreign tax rate t 
reduces the after-tax loss in the foreign country from the marginal unit of foreign 
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output, and has no effect on after-tax profits booked elsewhere. Thus, the rise in t 
leaves the MNC with a positive overall after-tax profit from its marginal foreign 
output; it responds by increasing foreign output. 
We now analyze when profit maximization would lead the MNC to set foreign output 
so that q < Cx. Rearrange the first-order condition (2) as: 
(3) (Cx - q ) ( l - t ) = (Ry-Q)(1 - T ) + ( 1 - k)(Q - q) 
This requires the MNC to increase foreign output until the marginal reduction in 
foreign after-tax profits equals the sum of the marginal increases in after-tax profits 
in the home subsidiary and in the tax haven subsidiary. If this sum were positive, 
then Xt > 0. We now identify conditions that ensure this outcome. These conditions 
can be interpreted as restrictions on Q implied by various home government 
benchmarks on transfer pricing. 
(A) Suppose that the home government benchmarks the transfer price Q against 
home marginal revenue, i.e., Q < Ry. Then the right side of (3) is positive, so Cx - q > 
0 and Xt > 0 by Lemma 1. The same conclusion obtains if the transfer price Q were 
benchmarked against home marginal cost Cx, for this equals home marginal revenue 
by the first-order condition (1) for home output X. 
(B) Suppose that the home government benchmarks the transfer price Q by 
postulating a profit margin m over the home subsidiary's average cost of production, 
which is flat or rising in output. Then: 
Q(1 - m ) < A < A + XAx = Cx = RY 
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Then (3) is positive provided that Qm(l - T) < (1 一 k)(Q - q). 
(C) Suppose that the home government benchmarks the transfer price Q (plus a profit 
margin m) against the home market price P and that the MNC faces perfect 
competition in the home market. Then Ry = P> Q/(l-m) so (3) is positive. 
(D) Suppose that the home subsidiary has some market power, i.e., Ry = P(1 - 1/E), 
where E is the home elasticity of demand. The home government benchmarks the 
transfer price Q (plus a profit margin m) against the market price P, so that P > 
Q/(l-m). A routine calculation shows that (3) is positive provided that: 
(4) {1 -(1 - 1/E)/(1 - m)}(l - T) < (1 - k)(Q - q)/Q 
The first-order condition (1) for the choice of home output implies that Cx = Ry = 
P(1 - 1/E) so E > 1. It follows that (3) is positive, provided that: 
(5) l - T < ( l - q / Q ) ( l - k ) 
Thus: 
Proposition 1: Suppose that the MNC views y, q and Q as parameters as it chooses x 
and X. Then a tax cut by the foreign country reduces MNC investment there under 
each of the following conditions: 
(A) The home government benchmarks the transfer price Q against home marginal 
revenue or home marginal cost. 
(B) The home government benchmarks the transfer price Q by postulating a profit 
margin m over the home subsidiary's average cost of production, which is flat or 
rising in output, and: 
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m ( l - T ) < ( l - k ) ( Q - q ) / Q 
i.e.，the after-tax profit margin in the home country is less than that achieved in the 
tax haven. 
(C) The home government benchmarks the transfer price Q (plus a profit margin m) 
against the home market price P and the MNC faces perfect competition in the home 
market. 
(D) The home government benchmarks the transfer price Q (plus a profit margin m) 
against the home market price P and (5) holds, i.e., the after-tax profit margin (1 -
k)(Q - q)/Q in the tax haven exceeds the rate at which the MNC retains home profits. 
Condition (5) in (D) is not onerous. If the tax haven tax rate k = 0，then (5) obtains if 
T > q/Q, i.e., the home tax rate exceeds the ratio of the tax haven's import price to its 
export price. Even if (5) were violated, the conclusion could still hold if the home 
government's benchmark postulates a substantial profit margin m and the demand 
elasticity E is high, so that (4) holds. In sum, if the MNC siphons profits into a tax 
haven, then a tax cut by the foreign country can reduce MNC output there under a 
broad range of circumstances. 
Proposition 1 gave conditions ensuring that Cx > q. It thus assumes that this outcome 
is consistent with any benchmark imposed by the foreign government. This would 
not be an issue for third world governments that lack the resources to define and 
administer any benchmarks at all. Other governments might benchmark the transfer 
price against unit costs a, which would allow a transfer price q < Cx = a + xax 
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一 provided that foreign unit costs increase with output. 
If the foreign government benchmarked the transfer price q against foreign marginal 
cost, so that q > Cx, and the home government benchmarked the transfer price Q 
against home marginal cost, so that Q < Cx, then the first-order conditions (1) and (3) 
could not both hold. This point may be of limited practical relevance, given the 
technical and legal difficulties that governments face in applying a benchmark based 
on marginal costs. However, it highlights the central theoretical issue raised by our 
analysis. At first sight, a transfer price equal to marginal costs seems eminently 
reasonable; the MNC is pricing output at the cost of the producing the last unit, just 
as economists recommend for a public utility. However, a MNC is playing quite a 
different game across multiple jurisdictions, highlighted by the first-order condition 
(3). This asserts that the MNC increases foreign output until the after-tax marginal 
loss in the foreign country equals the sum of the marginal increases in after-tax 
profits in the tax haven and in the home country. A marginal increase in foreign 
output always generates positive after-tax profits in the tax haven, so this sum will be 
positive as long as the home country's benchmarks on the price of imports from the 
tax haven ensure that the resulting home tax losses are not too severe — see the 
various hypotheses set out in Proposition 1. So long as the home government makes 
some minimal efforts to contain transfer pricing, profit maximization by the MNC 
requires marginal after-tax losses in the foreign country; a rise in the foreign tax rate 
reduces these marginal after-tax losses, so it leads the MNC to increase foreign 
output. 
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2.5. MNC Manipulation Of Host Country Demand 
This section again assumes that the MNC treats the transfer prices q and Q as 
parameters but allows it to manipulate foreign sales y. This opens up new channels 
whereby tax cuts can lead to a perverse response by the MNC. Profit maximization 
now requires the first-order condition: 
(6) 0 = Tiy = -Ry(1 - T ) + r y ( L - t ) - ( T - k ) Q + ( t - k ) q 
TCyt = q - ry. If q < ry, then at the margin there is a pre-tax gain from diverting sales 
from exports to foreign consumers; a tax cut increases the resulting after-tax profit. 
Thus, the direct effect of tax cut (for fixed values of the other variables) is to divert 
more sales from exports to foreign consumers. As in the previous section, if q < Cx 
then at the margin there is a pre-tax loss from producing for export to the tax haven; 
a tax cut increases the after-tax loss. Thus, the direct effect of the tax cut is to 
decrease foreign output. 
The interaction of these two direct effects of the tax cut can be seen by adding (2) to 
(6) to obtain: 
(7) Cx = ry. 
Thus, the foreign subsidiary equates marginal revenue and marginal cost, despite the 
option to export. This is because the foreign subsidiary can always produce a unit 
more and sell it to foreign consumers without altering the level of exports; (7) 
requires that this brace of policy adjustments yield zero profits at the margin. (7) 
implies that q < Cx if and only if q < ry, i.e., the tax cut directly decreases foreign 
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output if and only if it directly diverts more sales from exports to foreign consumers. 
The interaction of these two direct effects depends on the curvature of foreign sales 
revenue r(y) as a function of sales y. 
If ryy < 0，then the diversion of sales from exports to foreign consumers reduces 
marginal revenue. This further reduces the return to producing more foreign output, 
reinforcing the direct effect of the tax cut in reducing output. If ryy > 0, then the 
diversion of sales from exports to foreign consumers raises marginal revenue, hence 
the return from increasing foreign output. This offsets the direct effect of the tax cut 
in reducing foreign output. The most interesting case is where ryy = 0; i.e., the foreign 
subsidiary faces a perfectly competitive market, so that it has no control over the 
price p that it faces. Then the direct impact of the tax cut in reducing foreign output x 
would violate (7)，so this must be reversed by the indirect effects of the tax cut that 
operate via its impact on sales to the foreign and home markets. In fact, if ry is fixed, 
then foreign output x is also fixed by (7). Thus, a cut in the foreign profit tax does 
not affect foreign output: it merely diverts that output from exports to foreign 
consumers. These conclusions are confirmed by the following proposition, which is 
proved in the Appendix. 
Proposition 2: Suppose that the MNC views q and Q as parameters as it chooses x, 
X and y. Then Xt has the sign of (q - Cx)ryy. In particular: 
(a) If ryy = 0，then xt = 0，i.e., if the foreign subsidiary faces perfect competition in the 
foreign market, then a tax cut by the foreign country has no effect on the output 
of the foreign subsidiary. 
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(b) If Fyy < 0，and any of the conditions in A - D of Proposition 1 holds, then Xt > 0， 
i.e., a tax cut by the foreign country reduces the output of the foreign subsidiary. 
(c) If Tyy > 0，and q > Cx then Xt > 0, i.e., a tax cut by the foreign country reduces the 
output of the foreign subsidiary 
Textbooks usually draw the marginal revenue curve sloping downward, i.e., they 
presume that ryy < 0. In this case, Lemma 1 remains valid, as do the first-order 
conditions (1) and (2) and our inferences from these conditions that lead up to 
Proposition 1. The case ryy > 0 can arise if an increase in sales leads to a large 
increase in the demand elasticity. In that case, a tax cut by the foreign country 
reduces the output of the foreign subsidiary, even if the transfer price is less than the 
marginal cost of production in the foreign country. 
2.6 MNC Manipulation Of Explicit Benchmarks On Transfer Prices 
This section supposes that governments make explicit their benchmarks for transfer 
prices, so that the MNC can set its transfer prices exactly at those benchmarks — and 
would take account of how they are affected by its output and sale choices as it 
maximizes profits. Intuitively, the impact would appear to be as follows: 
(A) Suppose that the foreign government's explicit benchmark for q is an indicator of 
the foreign subsidiary's production costs (such as marginal cost or average cost plus 
a profit margin). If this falls with foreign output x, then the MNC has an additional 
reason to increase foreign output in response to a tax rise: to lower the price at which 
it can book exports to the tax haven, enabling more profits to be siphoned off there. 
2 8 
(B) Suppose that the home government's explicit benchmark for Q is an indicator of 
the home subsidiary's production costs. If this falls with home output X，then the 
MNC has an additional reason to increase foreign output in response to a tax rise: to 
allow a reduction of home sales of home output. The reason is that the fall in home 
output would then raise the transfer price Q that could be charged for imports from 
the tax haven, enabling more profits to be siphoned off there. 
Section 2.5 highlighted the indirect effects of a tax increase on x that operate via the 
induced changes in y and Y. Our formal analysis addresses these indirect effects; it 
confirms (A), but finds that (B) requires additional assumptions; otherwise, its 
conclusion can be reversed — even when Vyy < 0. 
In the model postulated in (A), the first-order condition for x can be written as: 
(3，） (Cx - q)(l - t ) + (t-k)qx(x - y) = ( R y - Q)(l _ T ) + (1 - k)(Q - q) 
In the Appendix, we apply the Implicit Function Theorem to the first-order 
conditions for x, y and X, then use the second-order conditions for profit 
maximization to obtain: 
Lemma 2: Suppose that the MNC views Q as a parameter as it chooses x, X and y, 
but views q as a function of x (because the foreign government explicitly 
benchmarks it against a cost indicator). Then Xthas the sign of G = 
(8) [Cx - q + (t - k)qx(x - y)/(l - t)]7rxx[ryyS(l-t) + (t - k)qx] - qx(x-y)(7rxx%y -
7r2xy)(l-k)/(l-t) 
In (8)，the first term in parentheses [..] includes the direct effects of t on the marginal 
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loss from producing more foreign output; these now sum up to Cx - q - qx(x - y). 
This first term also includes some of the indirect effects of t operating via induced 
changes in y and Y; the last group of terms in (8) includes the rest of these indirect 
effects. (8) groups the direct and indirect effects into terms that allow us to re-cycle 
Proposition 1. That is because the first term in parentheses multiplied by (1-t) is just 
the left side of version (3') of the first-order condition for x, whereas the right side of 
(3，)，namely: 
(9) ( R Y - Q ) ( l - T ) + ( l - k ) ( Q - q ) 
is identical to the right side of version (3) of the first-order condition for x that we 
used in Section 4. As Section 4's first-order conditions (1) and (6) for X and y remain 
valid in this model, so does Section 4's analysis of when (9) will be positive. To sign 
the other terms in (8)，we invoke the second-order conditions for a profit maximum: 
兀XX兀yy - Tt^xy > 0 and TCxx < 0. This yields the following Proposition, which upholds 
intuitive argument (A): 
Proposition 3: Suppose that the MNC views Q as a parameter in its decisions, but 
views q as a function of x (because the foreign government explicitly benchmarks it 
against a cost indicator). If ryy < 0 and qx < 0, then Xt > 0 under any of the conditions 
(A) - (D) of Proposition 1. 
Proposition 3 holds, for example, if the cost indicator q is the marginal or the average 
cost of the foreign subsidiary and this is non-increasing in output. Now suppose that 
the home country explicitly benchmarks the import price Q against a cost indicator 
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such as marginal or average cost.^ The first-order condition for X is now: 
(1，） 0 = 7Cx = (Ry-Cx)( 1 一T ) + (T — k) (X_y)Qx 
Lemma 2 continues to hold; it remains true that the first term in parentheses in (8) 
has the sign of (9). By (1 ’)，（9) equals: 
(10) (1 - k)(Q - q ) - ( T - k ) ( x - y)Qx + (Cx - Q ) ( l - T) 
When is (10) positive? If the home benchmark for Q is Cx, the marginal cost of the 
home subsidiary, then the last term in (10) vanishes, so (10) is certainly positive if 
Qx = Cxx < 0. This case accords with intuitive argument (B) about the incentives for 
the MNC to manipulate the explicit benchmark for transfer price Q. 
If the home benchmark Q is A, the average cost of the home subsidiary, then Cx = A 
+ XAx so (10) becomes: 
(11) (1 - k)(Q 一 q) - Ax{(T - k)(x - y) - (1 - T)X} 
In this case, we cannot always uphold the intuitive argument (B) about the incentives 
for the MNC to manipulate the explicit benchmark for Q. This is because of the 
indirect effects of this manipulation that operate via the induced changes in y and Y. 
This shows up in (11) in the term in braces {..} multiplying Ax; this term is positive 
only if the tax rate in the home country is high relative to that in the tax haven and/or 
imports are high relative to home production. 
Proposition 4: Suppose that the MNC faces explicit government benchmarks for its 
9 The argument that follows is readily extended to where Q(X) builds in a profit margin over the cost 
indicator, but the hypotheses required to sign Xt are then less transparent. 
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transfer prices, so that it regards q as a ftinction of x and Q as a ftinction of X. We 
suppose that ryy< 0 and qx < 0. Then Xt> 0 under any of the following circumstances: 
(a) Q = Cx and Cxx < 0 
(bi) Q = A ,Ax<Oand( l - T ) X < ( T - k ) ( x 一 y) 
(bii) Q = A ,Ax>Oand( l - T ) X > ( T - k ) ( x - y ) . 
2.7 The Race to the Bottom in International Tax Competition 
The above propositions show that minimal efforts by the home government to 
constrain transfer pricing ensure that a cut in the foreign tax would reduce foreign 
output. This outcome is contrary to conventional wisdom, so a foreign government 
that fails to attract MNC investment through a tax cut might well blame external 
events — and make further cuts to overcome them. One external event likely to be 
blamed would be a tax cut by the home country, which we now analyze. Again, the 
special case where the MNCs foreign sales are fixed highlights the economic 
intuition. In this case, we can apply the Implicit Function Theorem to the first-order 
condition (3)，then use the second-order condition for profit maximization to 
conclude that x j has the sign of tTxT = Q - Ry. This would be negative if Q < Ry. The 
intuition is that increased foreign output can be sold in the home country via the tax 
haven; the marginal unit generates a home profit if Q < Ry； a rise in the home tax T 
reduces the after-tax home profit, so it decreases foreign output. In the Appendix, we 
show that this conclusion remains valid if the MNC can manipulate foreign demand: 
Proposition 5: Suppose that the MNC views q and Q as parameters as it chooses x, 
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X and y, If ryy < 0 and Q < Ry then xt < 0, i.e., a tax cut by the home country 
increases MNC investment in the foreign country. 
The hypothesis Q < Ry, which ensures that a home tax cut increases the output of the 
foreign subsidiary, also ensures that a foreign tax cut reduces that output 一 see 
Proposition 1 A. To analyze the effects of tax cuts on the MNCs home subsidiary, we 
exploit our model's formal symmetry in the variables associated with the home and 
the foreign countries. This symmetry is manifested in the equivalence of the 
following expressions for MNC profits: 
兀=(l-T){R(X+x-y) — C(X)} + (T-k)Q(x-y) + (l-t){r(y) — c(x)} + (k-t)q(x-y) 
7C 二 (l-t){r(X+x-Y) - c(x)} + (t - k)q(X-Y) + (1-T){R(Y) — C(X)} + 
(k-T)Q(X-Y) 
The second expression can be obtained from the first by switching the sets of 
variables associated with the two countries, i.e., by switching lower and upper case 
letters (apart fi-om k). It follows that such a switch in a first-order condition or an 
application of the Implicit Function Theorem would yield another valid equation; 
such a switch in a theorem would yield another valid theorem, which we shall 
indicate by an asterisk. 
Thus, Lemma 2* asserts that X丁 has the sign of (Q - CX)RYY . Consequently, if R Y Y < 
0 and Q < Cx then XT > 0. Similarly, Proposition 5* asserts that if RYY < 0 and q < RY 
then Xt < 0. We can combine these conclusions with Propositions 1 and 5 to identify 
a range of circumstances such that Xt > 0, X丁 > 0, x丁 < 0 and Xt < 0. This would be 
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true, for example, given any of the conditions A - C of Proposition 1, for then (1) and 
(7) would imply that Q < Ry = Cx and q < ry = Cx. We have proved: 
Proposition 6: Suppose that the MNC views q and Q as parameters as it chooses x, 
X and y. Suppose also that RYY < 0 and R Y Y < 0 and any of the hypotheses A - C of 
Proposition 1 hold. Then Xt > 0, Xt > 0, xt < 0 and Xt < 0，i.e., a tax cut by either 
country would reduce MNC output in that country, but would increase MNC output 
in the other country. 
If both countries cut their taxes in tandem, then the perverse increase in foreign 
output from the home tax cut would partially offset the perverse decrease in foreign 
output from the foreign tax cut. The joint effect of increases in the two tax rates is: 
Xt + XT = _ (兀xt + 兀XT)/兀XX = — (Cx — q + Q _ RY)/兀XX 
The second-order condition for profit maximization requires that tTxx < 0. If both 
countries have the same tax rate t = T, then the first-order condition (3) implies that: 
Cx-q + Q - R Y = ( l - k ) ( Q - q ) / ( l - t ) > 0 
Thus, if the two countries start with equal tax rates, then a marginal increase in both 
would increase the output of the foreign subsidiary. The intuition is as follows. A fall 
in the foreign tax decreases foreign output in proportion to the marginal loss of the 
foreign subsidiary from increasing foreign output. A fall in the home tax increases 
foreign output in proportion to the marginal profit of the home subsidiary from 
selling the increased foreign output. The joint effect is positive because the marginal 
loss of the foreign subsidiary from increasing foreign output always exceeds the 
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marginal profit of the home subsidiary from selling the increased foreign output. This 
is true because profit maximization by the MNC requires it to increase the output of 
the foreign subsidiary until the marginal loss to the foreign subsidiary equals the 
marginal gain to the home subsidiary plus the marginal gain to the tax haven 
subsidiary. 
The Appendix extends our analysis to the case of variable foreign demand. The 
symmetry of the model then implies a similar conclusion for the joint effects of the 
tax increases on home output. Thus: 
Proposition 7: Suppose that the MNC views q and Q as parameters as it chooses x， 
X and y, and that ryy < 0，Ryy< 0 and t = T. Then Xt + xt > 0 and Xt + Xt > 0，i.e., if 
the two countries cut their taxes in tandem, then the outputs of both MNC 
subsidiaries will fall. 
Suppose that the two countries are vying for MNC investment and end up cutting 
their taxes in tandem. According to Proposition 7, both countries would end up with 
less MNC investment. Each country is likely to attribute this to the other country's 
tax cut, not to its own. Therefore, each is likely cut its own tax further; each would 
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then see a further reduction in MNC investment. This "race to the bottom" is replete 
with irony, for Proposition 6 shows that each country's tax cuts tends to increase 
MNC investment in the other country: the reduction in MNC investment in a country 
is actually driven by its own tax cut. 
2.8. Textbook Model without Transfer Pricing 
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To reaffirm the prediction of textbook model without transfer pricing that the effect 
of tax rate on foreign production is negative, I show the results as follows. 
71 = (l-T)[R(X+x-y) - C(X) -(a+m)(x-y)] +(l-t)[r(y) - c(x)+(a+m)(x-y)] 
An MNC has two subsidiaries located in home and host countries, respectively. The 
exports are equal to imports, x-y=Y-X, and the export price is also equal to import 
price, a+m; a is the average cost of production in a host country and m is an 
exogenous profit margin. Therefore, no transfer pricing strategy is used in this model; 
a+m is the arm-length price. 
Profit maximization now requires the first-order conditions: 
(12) 0 = 7I:x = (RY_CX)(1—T) 
(13) 0 = Tlx = (1 - T) [Ry -ax (X - YHA +m)]+(l 一 t) [-Cx +ax (x — y)+(a 
+m)] 
(14) 0 =兀X = (1 - T) [-Ry +(a +m)]+(l -1) [ry - (a +m)] 
Then I use the second-order conditions for profit maximization to obtain: 
Lemma 3: Suppose that the MNC views q and Q as the average cost of production of 
foreign subsidiary plus a exogenous profit margin m as it chooses x, X and y. Then Xt 
has the sign of I = 
(15) [(1- t)ryy + ax(t - T)]7ixx[ry-(a +m)]- ax(x-y)(7rxx7Cyy - 7r^Xy)(l-T)/(l-t) 
In (15)，the first term in parentheses [..] includes the indirect effects of t on the 
marginal sales of foreign output; the last group of terms in (15) includes the direct 
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effects through a, the average cost of foreign production. (15) groups the direct and 
indirect effects into terms that allow us to set up Proposition 8. 
Proposition 8： Suppose that the MNC views q and Q as the adding up of the average 
cost of production of foreign subsidiary and a exogenous profit margin m when it 
chooses X, X and y. If ryy< 0, ax> 0 and ry< (a +m)，then Xt < 0； 
Proposition 8 holds, if the cost indicator q (Q) is the adding up of the average cost of 
the foreign subsidiary and an exogenous profit margin m, foreign average cost is 
non-decreasing in output and the price of export is greater than marginal revenue of 
foreign subsidiary. 
2.9 Concluding Remarks 
Ricardo explained international trade in terms of differences in technology; 
Heckscher and Ohlin, in terms of factor endowment. Today, ever-finer international 
differences in technology and factor endowment can be arbitraged, as 
containerization cuts transport costs and information technology tightens supply 
chain management. The resulting fine international division of labor is coordinated 
within MNCs, whose internal trade now accounts for close to half of international 
trade. Within MNCs, the effective use of prices as a management tool, e.g., to 
monitor the performances of subsidiaries in different countries, would require prices 
that reflect marginal values and marginal costs. However, the rise of tax havens has 
opened up such lucrative opportunities for tax arbitrage that MNCs today heavily 
distort their internal prices or set up parallel pricing systems for tax purposes. 
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Normative trade theory has shown how price distortions lead to counter-intuitive 
results at the national level, such as the immiserizing growth that can arise when 
tariffs drive a wedge between domestic and international prices. The price distortions 
discussed in this paper are internal to MNCs, so they lead to counter-intuitive results 
at the level of firm responses to policy changes. One consequence could be a 
confused international "race to the bottom" of corporate taxes, not unlike the race 
that we observe today. 
To see the challenge to conventional wisdom posed by MNC exploitation of transfer 
pricing and tax havens, consider that few economists would fault a corporation that 
sold output at a price equal to marginal cost. However, Lemma 1 implies that if the 
MNC exports from the foreign subsidiary to the tax haven at a transfer price that 
equals the marginal cost of foreign production, then a tax cut by the foreign country 
would attract no additional investment by the MNC. Moreover, Proposition lA 
implies that if the MNC imports goods into the home country from the tax haven at a 
transfer price that equals the marginal cost of home production, then a tax cut by the 
foreign country would reduce MNC investment there. These conclusions highlight 
the fundamental issue raised by MNCs: a national government can monitor only one 
part of their global decisions, so national policies that would make sense if that part 
were the whole could be counter-productive. This problem can only worsen as more 
tax havens spring up to compete for corporate listings by promising more cover for 
MNC manipulations, while more corporations learn to exploit the opportunities for 
tax arbitrage that the tax havens offer. 
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Our analysis could be extended to other classic questions of international economics, 
such as the gains from trade and the effect of policy changes on factor prices when 
international trade is dominated by MNCs that distort prices to shift profits to tax 
havens, so that the prices no longer reflect marginal costs or marginal values. Our 
literature review noted empirical results by Swenson (1994) and Brainard (1996) that 
are consistent with our analysis. It would be useful to test the extent to which their 
results can be explained by transfer pricing, e.g., by adding instrument variables for 
the transfer pricing possible in different industries and with different trading partners. 
Chapter 3 Empirical Evidence 
3.1 Introduction 
Most developing countries want to attract as much foreign direct investment (FDI) as 
possible, so it is equally important to clarify the determinants of FDI in practice aside 
from theory. Tariffs and tax rates are the two most frequently discussed determinants 
of FDI, but with the expansion of the WTO, the difference in tariff rates among 
countries has been greatly reduced. The theoretical part of my thesis demonstrates 
the possibility of a positive relationship between a multinational FDI and the tax rate. 
By using panel data, the empirical part of this thesis not only seeks to examine the 
possibility that U.S. MNCs might want to invest less in a country that exercises a 
lower tax rate, but also seeks to test the prediction that U.S. MNCs will reduce the 
production in a particular country even after the corporate tax rate of that country 
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falls. Empirical researchers have considered several determinants of multinational 
FDI, such as tax rates, language, and GDP per capita; some of these researchers have 
been surprised to find a positive relationship between taxes and FDI. However, those 
research do not control for corruption and transfer pricing on a multinational 
investment. This chapter will fill in this gap. 
In this chapter, I use U.S. MNCs data to test the prediction that multinational 
production-location decision is greatly affected by the corruption level and the 
probability of implementing transfer pricing in foreign countries. Contrary to most 
previous research on the relationship between FDI and corruption, the result of this 
research shows that both the most corrupt and the cleanest countries are less 
attractive to U.S. MNCs than those countries with intermediate corruption levels. 
The detailed explanation will be provided in the data discussion part of this study. 
To control for the transfer pricing effect, I use the variable of a product - tax rate 
multiplied by internal trade ratio - to denote the probability of implementing transfer 
pricing in foreign countries by U.S. MNCs. The numerator of the internal trade ratio 
is the U.S. parent companies' imports from U.S. MNC foreign affiliates, and the 
denominator is the U.S. total imports from U.S. MNC foreign affiliates. This ratio 
thus represents the internal trade ratio of U.S. MNCs in a particular country. 
According to the theoretical results of this thesis, U.S. MNCs would be more likely 
to transfer the before-tax profits to the lower tax jurisdictions out of the foreign 
countries with higher tax rates. Therefore, the tax rate multiplied by internal trade 
ratio can denote the probability for U.S. MNCs of implementing transfer pricing in 
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foreign countries. This is because U.S. MNCs surely have more incentives to 
implement transfer pricing in a country with a higher tax and a higher internal trade 
ratio. The results of the regressions confirm the positive relationship between the 
transfer pricing variable and foreign production. 
This research also reaches an empirical result that the positive effects of the tax rate 
on production can be greatly affected by the opportunity of acting out corruption and 
transfer pricing. Through controlling for corruption, the coefficient of the tax rate 
decreases. Moreover, after the transfer pricing variable is keyed in, the tax rate 
coefficient further decreases. This empirical result effectively supports the theoretical 
predictions of the thesis that the transfer pricing captures most of the positive effects 
of the tax rate on production. Moreover, this thesis predicts that if data could be 
found to show the amount of a foreign country's FDI flowing into the "tax haven," 
the coefficient of the tax rate would further decrease or would eventually become 
"normally" negative as textbook models state. The research based on those data 
could be a good development for the empirical work of this thesis. 
3.2 Related Literature 
Tax rate is a very important factor which has an impact on the amount and location 
of FDI. Generally speaking, with all other considerations equal, higher tax rates 
reduce after-tax returns, thereby reducing incentives to commit investment funds. Of 
course, all other considerations are seldom equal. The key point in this chapter is to 
emphasize the important but easily ignored factors - corruption and transfer pricing. 
Another difference between this research and other empirical studies is that we use 
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the multinational foreign production to denote FDI, which excludes investment flows. 
However, economists doing research on the relationship between tax rate and FDI 
usually use different denotations to represent FDI. Therefore, the purpose of this part 
is to review research on the impacts of tax rates on foreign investments, which may 
show up in different definitions. 
Countries differ not only in their tax rates, but also in the ability of overseeing 
transfer pricing strategy, corruption levels, characteristics of their labor markets, 
nature of competition in product markets, cost and local availability of intermediate 
supplies, proximity to final markets, and a host of other attributes that influence the 
desirability of an investment location. Furthermore, the various tax and regulatory 
policies that are relevant to foreign investors may be correlated with non-tax features 
of economies that independently affect FDI levels. Therefore, it is important to 
interpret evidence of the effect of taxation with considerable caution. 
Most research focuses on FDI related to the United States, either outward or inward. 
The simple explanation for this focus is not only because the United States has the 
world's largest economy, but also that it collects and distributes larger amounts of 
higher-quality data on FDI activities than any other country. ^ ^ 
There are three studies that use time-series data to exploit cross-sectional differences 
that offer the potential for greater explanatory power. Slemrod (1990) distinguishes 
FDI in the United States by the tax regime in the country of origin. He compares the 
behavior of investors with tax systems similar to that used by the United States to the 
Devereux and Freeman (1995) and Hines (2001) are recent exceptions. 
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behavior of investors whose home countries exempt foreign profits from taxation. 
His results show no clear empirical pattern indicating that investors from countries 
that exempt U.S. profits from home-country taxation are more sensitive to U.S. tax 
changes than are investors from countries granting foreign tax credits. Swenson 
(1994) reports that after the passage of the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986, industries 
where the (U.S.) after-tax cost of capital climbed the most were those in which 
foreign investors concentrated their FDI in the post-1986 period, which is consistent 
with the tax incentives of foreign investors from countries granting foreign tax 
credits. Desai et al. (2002) show that "ten percent higher tax rates are associated with 
5.0 percent lower FDI and 0.9 percent lower returns on assets. Tax effects are 
particularly strong within Europe, where ten percent higher tax rates are associated 
with 7.7 percent lower FDI and 1.7 percent lower returns on assets." 
Other research on foreign investment location is exclusively cross-sectional, 
exploring the very large differences in corporate tax rates around the world to 
identify the effects of taxes on FDI. Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice 
(1994) estimate the effect of national tax rates on the cross-sectional distribution of 
aggregate American-owned property, plant, and equipment (PPE) in 1982. Grubert 
and Mutti's research is on the distribution of PPE in manufacturing affiliates in 33 
countries. They report a negative elasticity with respect to local tax rates. Hines and 
Rice study the distribution of PPE in all affiliates in 73 countries, reporting a much 
larger negative elasticity of PPE ownership with respect to tax rates. Comparing the 
tax sensitivity of aggregate PPE ownership in 58 countries in 1984 to that in 1992， 
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Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon (2001) report that estimated tax elasticities rise (in 
absolute value) from -1.5 in 1984 to -2.8 in 1992. Hines (2001) finds that Japanese 
investment is concentrated in countries with which Japan has "tax sparing" 
agreements that reduce home country taxation of foreign income by comparing the 
distribution of Japanese and American FDI around the world; the estimated FDI 
impact of "tax sparing" is consistent with the tax elasticity of PPE reported by Hines 
and Rice. Hines' (1996) study is about the distributions of FDI within the United 
States of investors whose home governments grant foreign tax credits for federal and 
state income taxes compared with those whose home governments do not tax income 
earned in the United States. His finding is that one percent state tax rate differences 
in 1987 are associated with ten percent differences in amounts of manufacturing PPE 
owned by investors from countries with different home-country taxations of 
foreign-source income. He likewise discovered three percent differences in the 
number of affiliates owned, thereby implying a tax elasticity of investment equal to 
-0.6.11 
3.3 Data and Empirical Specification 
As we are well aware, cross-country trade data have some limitations when it is 
compared. The situation gets even worse when it comes to the production data of a 
MNC's foreign affiliates. The most complete set of data can be found on the Web site 
of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). This thesis is mainly based on 
11 See Desai et al. (2002). 
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these data. Unfortunately, it just covers bilateral U.S. activity. Therefore, the analysis 
of this chapter will focus on the bilateral U.S. relationship. 
The BE A annual survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad provides the data for the 
financial and operating characteristics of U.S. firms overseas. These surveys require 
respondents to file detailed financial and operating items for each foreign affiliate 
and provide information on the value of transactions between the U.S. parent 
companies and their foreign affiliates. The International Investment and Trade in 
Services Survey Act governs the collection of the data and ensures that the "use of an 
individual company's data for tax, investigative, or regulatory purposes is 
prohibited." According to the BE A Data Confidential Statement, a willful 
noncompliance with the Act can result in penalties of up to $10,000 or a prison term 
of one year. As a result of these assurances and penalties, the BEA data are believed 
to be close to complete and that the levels of accuracy are high. In this thesis, the 
data from 1997 to 2004 are used. 
For the variables, the gross production of the majority-owned foreign affiliates of US 
MNCs is set as the dependent variable, and the foreign corporate tax rate is defined 
as the main explanatory variable. Based on the research reviewed above, this study 
uses population, GDP per capita, and language dummy to represent market 
accommodation, purchasing power, and business convenience, respectively. Recall 
that the government type in the theoretical model can be either clean or corruptive 
12 Mataloni (1995) provides a detailed description of the BEA data. The BEA data covers the 
multinational operations of firms owned by a U.S. citizen. 
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(see section 2.3), therefore I use corruption index here to reflect the nature of these 
two different kinds of governments. Since the level of MNCs' adjustments of foreign 
productions in response to the changes of tax rates varies with different types of 
governments, I input the corruption dummy to control for the type of governments. 
Moreover, a product of internal trade ratio multiplied by the tax rate is used to 
represent the transfer pricing effect. 
A. Gross production of affiliates 
The data include 43 countries in total, which are listed in Table 8. The selected 
countries represent diverse geographical coverage, population levels, GDPs per 
capital level, languages, institutions, and data coverage. The affiliates are 
majority-owned by non-bank U.S. parent companies. According to the BEA data 
guide, a "U.S. parent company" refers to the person, resident in the United States 
who owns or controls 10 percent or more of the voting securities of an incorporated 
foreign business enterprise or an equivalent interest in an unincorporated foreign 
business enterprise. ^^  
In order to match with the previous theoretical model, foreign gross production 
instead of foreign sales or foreign property, plant, and equipment is used as a 
dependent variable. Table 9 shows the mean and the standard error of the gross 
production by country and by year, respectively. 
B. Tax Rate 
13 U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Operation of U.S. Parent Companies and their Foreign Affiliates 
2002. Donald L. Evans, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
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The tax rate data include corporate statutory tax rates of 43 countries from 1997 to 
2004 from the KPMG's (2006) report of an international analysis of corporate tax 
rates. Most of the previous research did not use the time-series data on tax rates, for 
the reason that the tax rate does not change too much over the years. However, I 
found that during the period of 1997-2004, some countries were either reducing their 
tax rates or having a tax rate jump. In addition to the tax rate differences across 
countries, the variable of tax rates in this thesis is a better indicator to measure the 
influence of tax rates on multinational production. Table 10 reports the mean and the 
standard error of tax rates by country and by year, respectively. 
C. Corruption 
The annual corruption index is from Transparency International. It is a "poll of polls" 
as claimed by its chairman, Dr. Eigen. The index represents the average scores that 
international businessmen and financial journalists gave to different countries in a 
variety of contexts. The highest index 10 represents the cleanest government and the 
lowest 1 means that business transactions in that country are dominated entirely by 
extortion and k i c k b a c k s . T h i s thesis uses the data over the period 1997-2004. In 
the regression, a dummy variable is used to replace the corruption index: number 1 
refers to the corruption index from 3 to 7 while 0 refers to other index levels. The 
reason why the dummy variable is used is because the most corrupt and the cleanest 
countries are normally less attractive to MNCs seeking to use transfer pricing in 
internal trade. The empirical results below validate this prediction. Smarzynska and 
14 Transparency International, (1995). 
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Wei's (2002) research on the relationship between corruption and foreign direct 
investment presents a negative sign, which means that a higher level of corruption in 
one country will thwart more foreign investment. However, they do not consider that 
MNCs can use more transfer pricing strategies in the internal trade when they 
produce more in the country, whose bureaucracy is too corrupt to supervise transfer 
pricing or is unable to discern it. Generally, the most corrupt government has the 
most predatory bureaus which tend to snatch most of the MNCs' profits, and the 
cleanest government has the strongest motive and ability to oversee the MNCs' 
transfer pricing. These can explain why this thesis groups the cleanest and the most 
corrupt countries together as dummy 0. Table 11 reports the mean and the standard 
error of the original corruption index by country and by year, respectively. 
D. Internal Trade Ratio 
This thesis uses the ratio below to denote the probability of internal trade. The 
numerator of the ratio is the U.S. parent companies' imports from U.S. MNC foreign 
affiliates, and the denominator is the U.S. total imports from U.S. MNC foreign 
affiliates. Thus, the higher the ratio, the greater the internal trades in that country. 
This ratio multiplied by the tax rate can be an indicator of the probability of MNCs' 
using a transfer pricing strategy in their internal trade. According to my theoretical 
predictions, U.S. MNCs are more likely to transfer more before-tax profits to lower 
tax jurisdictions out of higher tax rate countries. Therefore, the higher tax rate 
multiplied by the higher internal trade ratio is sure to represent a higher probability 
of implementing transfer pricing. This data include 43 countries and cover the period 
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from 1997 to 2004. Table 13 shows the mean and the standard error of internal trade 
ratio by country and by year, respectively. 
E. Regional Dummy 
In this thesis, I use the regional dummy which divides all 43 countries into 5 groups: 
Europe, South America, North America, Asia, and Oceania (This data set does not 
include African countries). The reason for not using the country dummy is that it has 
a high correlation with the tax rate variable, which renders the coefficients of the tax 
rate insignificant. The empirical results below validate this prediction. The region 
dummy can not only control the same unobservable region attributes, but also control 
the different distances of foreign countries to the U.S., which can be another 
important factor that impacts foreign production. 
Three equations will be estimated. 
� 
Log{production^f)= n + YxTAX, + y^Log{POP), + Y,Log{GDPP), + yjanguage, 
+ 6Dummy _ year^i + ri,,_^Dummy _ region'' +w" 
(2) 
Log{production, ) = ro+ r^TAX, + y^LogiPOP)^, +y^Log{GDPP),, +yjanguage丨 
+ / ^Corruption j, + Dummy _ year^, + 77,,Dummy _ region'', 
(3) 
Log{production, )=ro+ 7 {TAX,, + y^Log{POP), + y^Log{GDPP)^, + yjanguage, 
+ rsCorruptiorii, + y^TRft + �Dummy — year^i + ?]丨卜、Dummy _ region''i + w" 
Where i=l, 2，...，43 are the country indexes for the 43 countries, t=l,2,...,8 are the 
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year indexes from 1997-2004, j=l’2，".,8 are the dummy year indexes from 1997 to 
2004，and h=l，2，...，5 are the region indexes (Europe, North America, South 
America, Asia, and Oceania). 
In (1)，I just control for the foreign market (population), foreign purchasing power 
(GDP per capita variable) and convenience (language dummy variable). Supposedly, 
this thesis can find a positive relationship between foreign gross production and 
foreign tax rate. Brainard (1997) reveals the positive impact of foreign tax rate on 
foreign sales. Her explanation about this result is that foreign tax rates may be 
affected by some macroeconomic variables without any detailed interpretation. 
However, I argue that the possibility of using transfer pricing in internal trade may be 
the primary reason that accounts for the positive relationship between the tax rate and 
foreign production or the foreign sales. Instead of using foreign sales as Brainard 
does, foreign production is used so as to match it with my theoretical part. 
In (2), I add the corruption dummy to control for the institution effect. There is 
supposed to be a positive relationship between foreign production and foreign tax 
rate, but in such a case, the coefficient of the tax rate would decrease. The reason is 
because the effect of a missing variable of corruption in the first regression makes the 
coefficient of tax variable biased upward, which is due to the positive coefficient of 
the corruption dummy variable and the positive correlation between the corruption 
dummy variable and the tax rate variable.'^ The reduction of the positive effect of 
15 See Table 13 and also the correlation between the corruption dummy variable and the tax rate 
variable is 0.161. 
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tax on foreign production shows that this positive relationship between tax and 
foreign production can be partly due to the corruption level. 
In (3)，I add the variable of the ratio of internal trade multiplied by Tax-rate variable 
to control for the transfer pricim effect. One might wonder why the ratio of internal 
trade is not simply inputted. This is because the effect of internal trade variable on 
foreign production should go through the variable of tax rate. In this sense, the 
product of these two variables can be a measurement of the transfer pricing effect. 
The reason behind this is that if a foreign country sets a higher tax rate and provides 
a bigger chance for U.S. MNCs to do internal trade, then the U.S. MNCs would be 
more likely to implement transfer pricing to transfer more profits out of that country 
to the lower tax rate jurisdictions such as the "tax haven" countries. Therefore, it is 
predicted that the coefficient of the transfer pricing effect should be positive. 
Furthermore, the coefficient of the tax rate is supposed to further decrease because 
the positive relationship between tax rate and foreign production is mainly due to the 
transfer pricing effect. 
The methodology of all the above three regressions is pooled OLS which controls for 
time trend and regional effects. In order to control for the unobservable regional 
attributes, which are constant over time, this chapter includes the regional dummy 
(Europe, North America, South America, Asia, and Oceania) to rule out the different 
regional influences. The yearly dummy is also added to control for the time trend of 
the 43 countries. 
3.4 Empirical Results 
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The three columns of Table 13 report the OLS estimates of Equations (1)，（2)，and (3) 
for foreign production. The coefficients of tax rate are positive and significant in all 
three equations, which are supportive of my theoretical prediction. The population, 
GDP per capita, and language also have significant positive effects. More population 
means a bigger potential market; a higher GDP per capita can represent the higher 
purchasing power of customers; the same language (English as the first official 
language) in foreign countries makes it easy to bring more U.S. MNCs' production, 
which can be due to the convenience effect; therefore, U.S. MNCs will produce more 
if the coefficients of the above three variables are bigger. In the second equation, I 
input the corruption dummy variable - 0 to mean the most corrupt and cleanest 
countries and 1 to represent the others - to control for the institution effect. The 
positive sign of the corruption dummy variable means that the most corrupt and 
cleanest governments are less attractive to U.S. MNCs' investment (production) than 
the other countries. This may be because the U.S. MNCs have fewer chances to 
implement transfer pricing under the eyes of the cleanest governments and can 
repatriate back less profits from the hands of the most predatory governments. In the 
third column, it is shown that if the transfer pricing effect is higher, then foreign 
production will be higher as well. This also confirms my prediction that the MNCs 
would produce more as long as the probability of doing transfer pricing in a higher 
tax rate country is very big, since they can transfer out more profits to "tax havens" 
by doing so. 
Table 13 also provides the changes of coefficients through three regressions. Firstly, 
5 2 
the coefficient of tax rate is reduced by 10% after the corruption dummy variable is 
placed and is then further reduced by 25.9% after the corruption dummy variable and 
transfer pricing variable (tax rate multiplied by ratio of internal trade) are put in. This 
result can support my theoretical prediction that the positive relationship between the 
U.S. MNCs' foreign production and foreign tax rate can mainly be due to the 
probability of implementing a transfer pricing strategy in internal trade. As argued 
above, the U.S. MNCs want to produce more in a foreign country where the 
corruption level is moderate and the probability for them to do transfer pricing is 
very high. The reduction of the tax rate coefficient between the third equation and 
second equation is bigger than the one between the first and the second. This shows 
that U.S. MNCs have their priority in the two considerations: the probability of doing 
transfer pricing is the most important factor to affect their decision whether to 
produce more or less in foreign countries. After that, they will begin to consider 
whether or not this foreign government would be too corrupt or too clean for them to 
transfer out as much profit as possible. This is why the coefficient of tax rate has 
become even less after both the corruption effect and transfer pricing effect are 
controlled. 
In order to verify whether the effect of tax rate on foreign production is still positive 
without the variable of corruption but only with the variable of transfer pricing in the 
regression, I estimate the following equation: 
(4) 
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Log{production,,)=厂o + r^TAX, + y^Log{POP),, + y^Log^GDPP),, + yjanguage, 
+ 厂5 777?" + 5J Dummy _ year^i + rj ,^_^Dummy _ region''i 
Column (b) of Table 14 shows that the coefficient of tax rate is still positive and 
statistically significant. Compared to the coefficients showed in column (a) of Table 
14, which are the estimation results of equation (1)，the coefficient of the tax rate of 
equation (4) is reduced after transfer pricing variable is included in, which is 
supportive of my theoretical prediction that transfer pricing effect captures some of 
the positive effect of tax rate on foreign production. 
To verify whether U.S. MNCs will adjust their foreign production before or after the 
changes of tax rate, I input a one-year-lag tax rate and a one-year-before tax rate 
instead of the present tax rate in the two regressions, respectively. Table 15 provides 
the result that the one-year-lag tax rate coefficient is insignificant. Moreover, Table 
16 provides the results that the coefficient of the one-year-before tax rate is also 
insignificant. This is because U.S. MNCs' reactions to the changes in tax rates are to 
adjust their productions internationally to maximize total profits all over the world; 
therefore, they do not want to adjust productions until the new tax rate takes effect. 
Besides, they do not need to wait for quite a long time to adjust their productions for 
profit maximization. 
Furthermore, in order to verify my prediction about the relationship between 
corruption and foreign production, two regressions are used: (a) I input two dummies 
- d u m m y A=1 indexes the most corrupt governments (whose original corruption 
indexes are below or equal to 2.9) and dummy A=0 if otherwise; dummy B=1 
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indexes the intermediately corrupt governments (whose original corruption indexes 
are higher or equal to 3 and lower or equal to 7) and dummy B=0 if otherwise - into 
Equation (1); (b) I also input two dummies - dummy B=1 indexes the 
intermediately corrupt governments (whose original corruption indexes are higher or 
equal to 3 and lower or equal to 7) and dummy B=0 if otherwise; dummy C=1 
indexes the least corrupt governments (whose original corruption indexes are higher 
than 7.1) and dummy C=0 if otherwise - into Equation (1). 
Table 17 shows that in the first regression the coefficient of dummy A is negative and 
the coefficient of dummy B is positive, which means that the countries on the 
intermediate corruption level have more foreign production from U.S. MNCs. Table 
18 shows that in the second regression the coefficient of dummy C is also negative 
and the one of dummy B is still positive. This result indicates that the cleanest 
countries also have less U.S. MNCs' production than intermediate corruption level 
countries. However, the values of the three dummies are not significant. Therefore, 
we only choose dummy B in the equations. The final result in Table 13 shows the 
statistically significant positive relationship between the intermediate corruption 
level counties and the foreign production of U.S. MNCs. 
To further prove the high correlation between country dummy and tax rate, a 
regression of the tax rate on country dummies is taken. Table 19 shows that most 
coefficients of country dummies are significant and that the R-square is relatively 
high. This confirms the high relativity between country dummy and tax rate variable. 
This may be because the country dummy captures most of the effects of tax rate on 
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foreign production. Therefore, the region dummy is chosen in the final equations. 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
The empirical results are robust enough to support my theoretical predictions. The 
foreign production of U.S. MNCs are increasing in foreign tax rates, GDP per capita, 
population, and language similarity. It is also increasing in the corruption dummy 
and the transfer pricing probability. The only puzzle is the fact that foreign 
production is highest in the countries with intermediate corruption levels. Both the 
most corrupt and the cleanest countries are less attractive to the U.S. MNCs. This 
may be because it is more difficult for U.S. MNCs to implement a transfer pricing 
strategy to transfer profits to other lower tax jurisdictions in these two kinds of 
countries. The most corruptive countries may be so predatory that they snatch most 
of the U.S. MNCs' profits, and the cleanest countries may have the strongest ability 
to oversee the transfer pricing. 
The finding that the coefficient of the tax rate has been reduced after the corruption 
dummy variable and transfer pricing variable are inputted shows that the positive 
relation between the tax rate and foreign production can mainly be due to the fact 
that corruption dummy variable and transfer pricing effects are missing in the first 
equation. Because the correlations between the corruption dummy variable and tax 
rate，as well as between the transfer pricing variable and tax rate, are positive, and 
the coefficients of corruption dummy and transfer pricing variable are also positive, 
if they are missing in the regression, then the coefficient of tax rate will have an 
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upward bias.^^ Furthermore, if the variable of foreign countries' trade with "tax 
havens" to control the transfer pricing effect in trade with "tax havens" could be 
found, it is expected that the coefficient of tax rate would even become "normally" 
negative as textbook models predict. That result would be a good development of 
this research. 
16 See Table 13 and also the correlation between transfer pricing variable and tax rate is 0.0694. 
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APPENDIX 
To minimize repetition, we shall first analyze the more complex model of Section 6, 
then derive the results of Section 5 as a special case. 
Proof of Lemma 2 
To simplify notation, define s = 1-t, S = 1-T, h = 1-k as the fraction of profits retained 
by the MNC in the foreign country, the home country and the tax haven. Then MNC 
profits are: 
71 = S {R(X+x-y) - C(X)} + (h — S)Q(x-y) + s{r(y) — c(x)} +(s -h)q(x-y) 
The first-order conditions for a profit maximum are: 
(16) 0 = 7tx = (RY - Cx)S + (h-S)Qx(x - y) 
(17) 0 = 7CX = RYS - CXS + ( h - S ) Q + (s - h)q + ( S - h)qx(x - y) 
(18) 0 = 7IY = - RYS + TyS - (h - S)Q - (s - h)q 
Let J be the Jacobian of n with respect to X, x and y and let G be the determinant: 
兀XX -兀Xs 兀Xy 
TtxX -Ttxs 兀 xy 
TlyX -Tlys Ttyy 
The Implicit Function Theorem implies that Xs = G/J. The second-order conditions 
for maximizing n require a negative J, so Xt= - Xs has the sign of G, i.e., of: 
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Tlxx 0 - RYYS - (h — S)Qx 
SRYY + (H - S ) Q x CX-Q-QX(x - y) - RYYS - (h 一 s)qx 
-RYYS - (h 一 S )Qx q - ry RYYS + lyyS 
Adding the third row to the second row does not alter the value of the determinant: 
Ttxx 0 -RYYS-(h-S)Qx 
0 Cx - ry - qx(x 一 y) lyyS + (h - s)qx 
-RYYS - (h - S )Qx q - RY RYYS + RYYS 
Thus, Xt has the sign of: 
(19) G = -[qx(x-y) + ry— Cx](7rxx%y 一 Tt^xy) + (ry - q)兀xxOyyS + (h-s)qx] 
Adding the first-order conditions (13) and (14) yields: 
(20) 0 = ry -Cx + ( s - h ) q x ( x - y)/s 
so: 
(21) ( x - y)qx + ry-Cx=(x-y)qx + qx(x - y)(h - s)/s = qx(x - y)h/s 
Substituting into (15), we conclude that Xt has the sign of: 
(8) G = -[qx(x-y)h/s](7Cxx%y - n \y ) + [Cx — q + qx(x-y)(h - s)/s]7rxx[ryys + 
(h-s)qx] 
Proof of Proposition 2 
If q is fixed then qx= 0 and G = (Cx - q)7Cxxi"yyS. But the second-order conditions for a 
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profit maximum require that 7ixx< 0， so Xt has the sign of (q - Cx)ryy. 
Proof of Proposition 5 
The Implicit Function Theorem implies that xs = H/J, where H is the determinant: 
兀XX -兀xs 兀Xy 
H = TlxX -兀 xS 兀 xy 
兀 yX -TCyS 兀 yy 
The second-order conditions for maximizing n require a negative J, so XT= - xs has 
the sign of: 
兀XX Cx - Ry - RyyS 
H = SRYY Q - R Y - RYYS 
- S R Y Y RY - Q RYYS + RYYS 
Adding the third row to the second row does not alter the value of this determinant. 
Moreover, the first-order condition (1) implies that RY - CX = 0 so: 
TIXX 0 - RYYS 
H = 0 0 RYYS = RYYSTTXXW - RY) 
- R Y Y S RY - Q RYYS + RYYS 
Proposition 5 follows immediately 
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Proof of Proposition 7 
Our proofs of Propositions 2 and 6 imply that Xt+ xjhas the sign of: 
G + H = ( C x - q + Q - RY)ryyS7rxx = ryyS 兀 xx(l-k)(Q - q)/(l-t) by (3) 
The second-order conditions for maximizing n require that TTXX < 0，so this is positive 
when Fyy < 0. 
Proof of Lemma 3 
The MNC profits are: 
TT = (l-T)[R(X+x-y) - C(X) -(a+m)(x-y)] +(l-t)[r(y) - c(x)+(a+m)(x-y)] 
The first-order conditions for a profit maximum are: 
(12*) 0 = 7tx = ( R Y - C x ) ( l - T ) 
(13*) 0 = TLX = (1 - T) [RY -AX (x - y)-(a +m)]+(l — t) [-CX +AX (x - y)+(a 
+ m ) ] 
(14*) 0 =兀Y = (1 - T) [-RY +(a +m)]+(l -1 ) [RY -(a +m)] 
Let J be the Jacobian of n with respect to X, x and y and let I be the determinant: 
兀 XX -TCXs 兀 Xy 
TtxX -TTxs 兀 xy 
兀yX •冗ys 兀yy 
The Implicit Function Theorem implies that Xg = I/J. The second-order conditions for 
maximizing n require a negative J, so Xt = - Xs has the sign of I，i.e., of: 
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TCxx 0 - RYYS 
SRyy Cx - (a+m )-ax(X - y) (- Ryy +ax )S — sax 
- R y y S a+m -ry RyyS + ryyS 
Adding the third row to the second row does not alter the value of the determinant: 
TCxx 0 - RYYS 
0 Cx - ry -ax(x - y) ax S+ ryyS- sax 
- R y y S a+m -ry RyyS + ryyS 
Thus, Xthas the sign of: 
(22) I = [Cx - ry -ax(x-y)] (7rxx%y - 7C^Xy)-(a+m-ry) [ax S+ ryyS- sax]7txx 
Adding the first-order conditions (13) and (14) yields: 
(23) 0 = ( S - s)ax(x - y) -s(ry -c^) 
so: 
(24) Cx - ry -ax(x — y)= ax(x - y)S/s 
Substituting into (22), we conclude that Xt has the sign of: 
(25) I = [(l- t)ryy + ax(t-T)]7txx[ry-(a +m)]- ax(x-y)(7ixx%y — 7i^xy)(l-T)/(l-t) 
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Table 1. Related Party Trade as a Share of U.S. Imports from Selected Countries and Regions 
YEAR TOTAL CANADA JAPAN MEXICO TAIWAN CHINA KOREA 
TRADE 
1992 45.0 46.0 75.0 63.3 15.9 10.5 26.8 
1993 45,4 45.2 75.3 65.3 17.3 10.5 31.3 
1994 46.4 44.6 75.5 69.2 18.8 13.3 37.5 
1995 47.4 46.0 75.4 66.1 20.3 14.6 41.9 
1996 46.5 44.8 72.7 66.5 21.4 15.2 44.0 
1997 46.0 43.6 70.9 65.4 21.8 16.2 43.1 
1998 46.9 44.1 73.7 66.3 21.8 17.7 44.9 
1999 46.7 43.1 73.7 664 20.8 17.6 49.3 
2000 46.7 44.0 74.3 66.1 21.6 18.1 55.4 
2001 46.5 41.5 73.5 67.5 >1.1 18.1 55.1 
2002 47.6 42.4 76.6 66.7 22.2 20.5 56.1 
2003 47.5 43.3 79.1 64.2 22.1 23.0 58.5 
2004 47.8 45.7 78.9 61.1 23.9 27.1 62.3 
2005 ^ ^ ^ 25.8 57.7 
Table 2. Related Party Trade as a Share of U.S. Exports from Selected Countries and Regions 
YEAR TOTAL CANADA JAPAN MEXICO TAIWAN CHINA KOREA 
TRADE 
1992 30.9 45.3 36.2 38.7 10.0 4.9 11.1 
丨 993 31 9 44.8 35.3 44.8 10.5 5.8 10.6 
1994 32.2 44.0 36.9 43.9 11.7 6.4 11.1 
1995 31.9 44.0 34.6 47.7 11.6 4.7 12.0 
1996 31.8 44.0 35.6 45.7 11.7 7.4 11.7 
1997 31.7 43.1 38.2 46.1 13.1 7.3 12.4 
1998 31.8 41.9 37.6 45.3 14.3 11.1 11.3 
1999 32.1 42.4 36.3 44.3 16.0 11.6 11 4 
2000 31.3 41.2 37.4 42.5 14.1 12,2 11.4 
2001 30.6 39.7 36.9 40.9 16,3 13.0 12.9 
2002 31.9 42.5 34.0 43.1 19.9 123 12.7 
2003 32.2 43.5 33.S 40.7 18.7 14.8 14.1 
2004 30.8 42.0 32.1 41.5 16.4 14.2 
2005 31.3 42.4 33.8 ^ ^ 16.1 
Source: US Census Bureau News, May 12，2006. “US goods trade: Imports & Exports by related 
parties; 2005" 
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Table 3A: Top 10 Source Countries for Re-exports via Hong Kong, 2006 
Country Value Share Country Value Share 
PRC 187.35 62.81% Malaysia 6.44 2.16% 
Japan 24.19 8.11% Thailand 4.47 1.50% 
Taiwan 21.38 7.17% Germany 3.79 1.27% 
Korea 10.90 3.65% Philippines 3.58 1.20% 
USA ^ 2.99% Singapore 1.14% 
All 298.27 100% 
Table 3B: Top 10 Destinations of Re-exports via Hong Kong, 2006 
Country Value (US$ Share Country Value (US$ Share 
PRC 143.07 47.97% Taiwan 6.11 2.05% 
USA 43.33 14.53% South 6.42 2.15% 
Japan 14.81 4.96% Singapore 5.70 1.91% 
Germany 9.07 3.04% Netherlands 4.24 1.42% 
UK ^ 2.83% France ^ 1.37% 
All 298.27 100% 
Source： http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hong_kong_statistics/statistical_tables/index 
Table 4A: Top 10 sources of China's FDI in 2005 
Country Value (bns.) Share Country Value (bns.) Share 
Hong Kong 17.95 29.76% Singapore 2.20 3.65% 
British 9.02 14.95% Taiwan 2.15 3.56% 
Japan 6.53 10.83% Cayman 1.95 3.23% 
South Korea 5.17 8.57% Germany 1.53 2.54% 
USA ^ 5.07% Samoa 2.24% 
~A\\ countries 60.32 100% HK+BVI+C 30.27 50.18% 
Table 4B; Top 10 sources of China's FDI in 2006 
Country Value (bns.) Share Country Value (bns.) Share 
Hong Kong 20.23 32.09% Singapore 2.26 3.58% 
British 11.25 17.84% Taiwan 2.14 3.39% 
Japan 4.60 7.30% Cayman 2.10 3.33% 
South Korea 3.90 6.19% Germany 1.98 3.14% 
USA ^ 4.55% Samoa 2.44% 
All countries 63.05 100% HK+BVI+C 35.12 55.70% 
Table 4C: Top 10 sources of China's FDI (January to March 2007) 
Country Value (bns.) Share Country Value (bns.) Share 
Hong Kong 4.96 31.19% USA 0.69 4.34% 
British 3.59 22.58% Cayman 0.55 3.46% 
Japan 1.12 7.04% Samoa 0.44 2.77% 
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South Korea 0.91 5.72% Taiwan 0.35 2.20% 
Singapore 4.78% Mauritius 1.95% 
All countries 15.90 100% HK+BVI+C 9.85 61.95%— 
Source:http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aartide/tongiiziliao/v/200704/20070404572808.html.website of 
Commerce Ministry ofP.R. China, 2005-2007. 
Table 5: Round Tripping of FDI to the PRC: The Case of U.S. (USD million) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
A 74 556 1232 261 933 1250 1497 1947 1817 1225 914 
B 511 2063 2491 3083 3443 3239 3898 4216 4384 4433 5424 
C 85.5 73.1 50.5 91.5 72.9 61.4 61.6 53.8 58.6 72.4 83.1 
Source: Geng Xiao (2004) 
Table 6: Top 24 Destinations for FDI in 2005 
Country US$ (bns.) Country US$ (bns.) 
United Kingdom 164.53 Mexico 18.06 
US 99.44 Brazil 15.07 
China 72.41 Russia 14.60 
France 63.58 Bermuda 13.62 
Netherlands 43.63 UnitedArab Emirates 12.00 
Hong Kong 35.90 Cayman Islands 11.22 
Canada 33.82 Czech Republic 10.99 
Germany 32.66 Colombia 10.19 
Belgium 23.69 Turkey 9.68 
Spain 22.99 British Virgin Islands 9.62 
Singapore 20.08 Austria 8.92 
Italy 19.97 Poland 7.72 
Source： Official Web site of Commerce Ministry of P. R. China 
Table 7: Percentage of foreign firms reporting losses in the PRC 
1988 to 1993 35 - 4 0 percent 
1994 and 1995 5 0 - 6 0 percent 
1996 to 2000 60 - 70 percent 
2001 and 2004 55 percent 
2005 43 percent 
Source: Jian Li and Alan Paisey Transfer Pricing Audits in China by (Palgrave MacMillan, 2007). 
Olivia Chung. “How foreign firms dodge taxes in China". Asian Times, April, 11, 2007. 
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Table 8 43 Countries by region 
Europe North America South America Asia Oceania 
Austria Canada Argentina China Australia 
Belgium Brazil Hong Kong New Zealand 
Denmark Chile India 
Finland ! Colombia Indonesia 
France Dominica Re Japan 
Germany Ecuador Korea 
Greece Honduras Malaysia 
Ireland Mexico Philippines 
Italy Panama Singapore 
Luexmbourg Peru Taiwan 








Table 9 Gross Foreign Productions of U.S. MNCs by Country from 1997 to 2004 
(Million U.S. Dollars) 
Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Mean S.D. 
Argentina 3922 3958 4183 4066 3677 1724 2918 4065 3564.1 789.4 
Australia 7366 6633 7980 8246 7724 7433 8931 11227 8192.5 1309.3 
Austria 1415 1613 1822 1749 1666 1588 1606 丨 637 120.0 
Belgium 7190 7449 9163 8248 7384 9401 9728 11311 8734.3 1339.4 
Brazil 19277 14948 10989 12830 1075丨 8881 9404 11827 丨2363.4 3169.3 
Canada 27862 26076 40686 45961 41575 39777 44351 47554 39230.3 7508.3 
Chile 816 653 483 535 612 542 580 601 602.8 94.4 
China 2116 2266 3172 4381 4583 5414 6352 9018 4662.8 2148.4 
Colombia 1145 914 756 777 681 767 659 775 809.3 145.6 
Denmark 736 822 1033 983 802 1139 1138 1277 991.3 179.0 
Dominica Re 217 249 303 333 293 283 342 301 290.1 38.6 
Ecuador 72 93 49 88 76 105 131 184 99.8 39.0 
Finland 850 887 771 755 657 609 560 727 113.5 
France 20038 18898 22113 20602 19681 20365 23763 26194 21456.8 2286.6 
Germany 39400 39024 46135 33895 32584 34061 36295 41825 37902.4 4306.2 
Greece 403 421 425 373 345 359 485 1945 594.5 512.1 
Honduras 129 144 165 221 141 217 219 203 179.9 36.7 
Hong Kong 1434 1156 1090 1426 1293 867 1206 1361 1229.1 179.8 
India 514 535 709 886 1045 948 1197 1689 940.4 360.5 
Indonesia 363 255 237 285 464 523 627 393.4 137.7 
Ireland 9162 11289 丨2950 13462 14424 20057 21992 19187 15315.4 4271.3 
Italy 9418 8452 17222 15894 15787 15657 17579 20230 15029.9 3788.5 
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•Japan 8550 7925 丨 2677 17830 19129 16364 18503 20244 15152.8 4521 6 
K o r � 947 859 1554 2505 2081 2862 3075 4029 2239 1026 5 
Luexmbourg 620 638 683 -232 571 598 696 822 549.5 304 1 
Malaysia 2965 1770 3006 3098 2928 3602 3080 3587 3004.5 529.4 
Mexico 10242 11435 13663 15078 15782 16181 15705 14703 14098.6 2038.2 
Netherlands 9407 9019 10717 10680 10204 11060 12570 14900 11069,6 1764.9 
New Zealand 1897 1060 794 530 682 713 979 1289 993 409.1 
No>"way 443 379 1555 1612 1715 1763 1984 2396 1480.9 665.1 
Panama 83 63 63 32 55 47 51 32 53.3 15.9 
Pe™ 191 225 172 94 96 122 151 231 160.3 50.4 
Philippines 丨 189 1152 1628 1676 1465 1297 1307 1437 1393.9 179.8 
Portugal 773 820 897 1989 1917 2133 2530 2860 1739.9 759.8 
Singapore 6753 5048 6653 9030 5940 6438 7814 8331 7000.9 1224.0 
Spain 6674 7507 7611 6945 6798 7270 8279 9360 7555.5 835.9 
Sweden 2151 2148 2885 3328 2889 3231 5049 4903 3323 丨 037.9 
Switzerland 3055 2638 3246 3471 2102 2465 3071 4253 3037.6 619.8 
Taiwan 1558 1346 1691 1757 1456 1371 1613 2178 1621.3 250.8 
Thailand 1043 1874 1742 1916 1944 1794 2210 3917 2055 770.2 
Turkey 1289 1341 1292 1380 1097 1446 2172 2978 1624.4 592.2 
United Kingdom 32343 34654 52981 46089 40963 42939 47130 53473 43821.5 7227.4 
Venezuela 1613 丨 449 1217 1083 1617 1173 1345 1708 1400.6 217.4 
Mean 5758.9 5583.4 7189.8 7113.7 6690.1 6874.1 7659.9 9210.1 
S.D. 8921.4 8833.6 12042.4 11060.6 10236.7 10433.8 11430.6 12816 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis of U.S. Commerce Ministry, 1997-2004. 
Table 10 Tax Rates by Country from 1997 to 2004 
Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 mean S.D. 
Argentina 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.345 
Australia 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.335 0.02 
Austria 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0 
Belgium 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.34 0.34 0.386 0.02 
Brazil 0.25 0.25 0.33 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.04 
Canada 0.446 0.446 0.446 0.446 0.421 0.386 0.36 0.36 0.414 0.03 
Chile 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.155 0.00 
China 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 
Colombia 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0 
Denmark 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.315 0.01 
Dominica Rep. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 
Ecuador 0.32 0.362 0.15 0.25 0.362 0.362 0.36 0.36 0.316 0.07 
Finland 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.286 0.00 
France 0.366 0.416 0.4 0.366 0.353 0.343 0.34 0.34 0.366 0.02 
Germany 0.575 0.566 0.523 0.516 0.383 0.383 0.39 0.38 0.465 0.08 
Greece 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.375 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.378 0.02 
Honduras 0.402 0.402 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.288 0.06 
Hong Kong 0.165 0.165 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.163 0.00 
67 
India 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.385 0.395 0.357 0.36 0.35 0.364 0.01 
Indonesia 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.39 0.3 0.3 0.3 0 
Ireland 0.36 0.32 0.28 0.24 0.2 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.226 0.08 
Italy 0.532 0.412 0.412 0.412 0.402 0.402 0.38 0.37 0.416 0.04 
Japan 0.516 0.516 0.48 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.451 0.04 
Korea 0.308 0.308 0.308 0.308 0.308 0.297 0.29 0.29 0.303 0.00 
Luexmbourg 0.303 0.374 0.374 0.374 0.374 0.303 0.30 0.30 0.339 0.03 
Malaysia 0.3 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.282 0.00 
Mexico 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.343 0.00 
Netherlands 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.345 0.34 0.34 0.348 0.00 
New Zealand 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 
Norway 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0 
Panama 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.3 0.3 0.352 0.03 
Peru 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.27 0.3 0.296 0.01 
Philippines 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.327 0.01 
Portugal 0.396 0.374 0.374 0.374 0.352 0.33 0.33 0.27 0.350 0.03 
Singapore 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.255 0.245 0.22 0.22 0.247 0.01 
Spain 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0 
Sweden 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0 
Switzerland 0.285 0.275 0.251 0.251 0.247 0.245 0.24 0.24 0.254 0.01 
Taiwan 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 
Thailand 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0 
Turkey 0.44 0.44 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.3 0.25 0.343 0.06 
United 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.303 0.00 
Venezuela 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0 
Mean 0.338 0.337 0.324 0.324 0.319 0.314 0.30 0.30 
S.D. 0.081 0.076 0.075 0.069 0.061 0.060 0.06 0.05 
Source: KPMG's report (2006) 
Table 11 Original Corruption Index by country from 1997 to 2004 (0 is the most 
corruptive country) 
Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 mean S.D. 
Argentina 3 3 1 5 1 5 I s I s ~ 2.95 0.36 
Australia 8.86 8.7 8.7 8.3 8.5 8.6 8.8 8.8 8.66 0.17 
Austria 7.61 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.8 8 8.4 7.8 0.27 
Belgium 5.25 5.4 5.3 6.1 6.6 7.1 7.6 7.5 6.36 0.92 
Brazil 3.56 4 4.1 3.9 4 4 3.9 3.9 3.92 0.15 
Canada 9.1 9.2 9.2 9.2 8.9 9 8.7 8.5 8.98 0.24 
Chile 6.05 6.8 6.9 7.4 7.5 7.5 7.4 7.4 7.12 0.38 
China 2.88 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.34 0.21 
Colombia 2.23 2.2 2.9 3.2 3.8 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.18 0.63 
Denmark 9.94 10 10 9.8 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.72 0.23 
Dominica Re 3.3 2.9 
Ecuador 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.3 2.2 2,2 2.4 2.34 0.13 
Finland 9.48 9.6 9.8 10 9.9 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.74 0.15 
France 6.66 6.7 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.3 6.9 7.1 6.71 0.22 
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Germany 8.23 7.9 8 7.6 7.4 7.3 7.7 8.2 7.79 0.33 
Greece 5.35 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.63 0.21 
Honduras 1.7 1.8 2.7 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.25 0.39 
Hong Kong 7.28 7.8 7.7 7.7 7.9 8.2 8 8 7.82 0.86 
India 2.75 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.79 0.07 
Indonesia 2.72 2 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.9 2 1.98 0.3 
Ireland 8.28 8.2 7.7 7.2 7.5 6.9 7.5 7.5 7.6 0.43 
Italy 5.03 4.6 4.7 4.6 5.5 5.2 5.3 4.8 4.97 0.32 
Japan 6.57 5.8 6 6.4 7.1 7.1 7 6.9 6.6 0.47 
Korea 4.29 4.2 3.8 4 4.2 4.5 4.3 4.5 4.22 0.22 
Luexmbourg 8.61 8.7 8.8 8.6 8.7 9 8.7 8.4 8.69 0.16 
Malaysia 5.01 5.3 5.1 4.8 5 4.9 5.2 5 5.04 0.15 
Mexico 2.66 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.4 0.31 
Netherlands 9.03 9 9 8.9 8.8 9 8.9 8.7 8.92 0.11 
New Zealand 9.23 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.5 9.5 9.6 9.43 0.1 
Norway 8.92 9 8.9 9.1 8.6 8.5 8.8 8.9 8.84 0.19 
Panama 3.7 3 3.4 3.7 3.45 0.29 
Peru 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.1 4 3.7 3.5 4.1 0.37 
Philippines 3.05 3.3 3.6 2.8 2.9 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.92 0.36 
Portugal 6.97 6.5 6.7 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.6 6.3 6.51 0.22 
Singapore 8.66 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.3 9.15 0.21 
Spain 5.9 6.1 6.6 7 7 7.1 6.9 7.1 6.71 0.44 
Sweden 9.35 9.5 9.4 9.4 9 9.3 9.3 9.2 9.31 0.14 
Switzerland 8.61 8.9 8.9 8.6 8.4 8.5 8.8 9.1 8.73 0.22 
Taiwan 5.02 5.3 5.6 5.5 5.9 5.6 5.7 5.6 5.53 0.25 
Thailand 3.06 3 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.6 3.22 0.17 
Turkey 3.21 3.4 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.39 0.24 
United Kingdom 8.22 8.7 8.6 8.7 8.3 8.7 8.7 8.6 8.57 0.18 
Venezuela 2.77 2.3 2.6 1.1 2.8 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.55 0.19 
Mean ^ 6 ^ 6 " “ T m 5 . 9 4 
S.D. 2.52 2.62 2.58 2.5 2.45 2.56 2.6 2.6 
Source: From International Transparency Official Website, 1997-2004 
Table 12 U.S. MNCs' Internal Trade Ratio by country from 1997 to 2004 
Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 mean S.D. 
Argentina 46.2 88.74 38.81 34.12 78.3 92.95 90.1 89.8 69.9 23.9 
Australia 48.9 50.04 63.87 51.16 72.2 87.64 89.6 87.6 68.9 16.7 
Austria 72.1 65.52 95.49 81.62 65.2 70.91 75.1 10.5 
Belgium 91.3 96.47 95.43 94.29 94.8 97.25 98.1 94.5 95.3 1.98 
Brazil 92.7 95.07 95.39 92.48 88.7 79.49 69.0 72.6 85.7 9.83 
Canada 84.4 84.62 85.09 86.00 84.9 83.48 82.7 85.7 84.6 1.03 
Chile 56.9 53.85 65.24 58.80 64.6 99.32 98.3 81.3 72.3 17.1 
China 79.3 68.31 78.37 83.37 84.1 85.85 80.8 82.8 80.3 5.12 
Colombia 74.8 64.29 85.23 87.6 37.95 72.8 71.1 70.5 15.2 
Denmark 76.8 85.09 67.35 84.93 82.8 79.25 81.9 56.1 | 76.8 9.49 
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Dominica Rep. 92.8 95.59 93 92.97 68.0 83.53 87.6 9.56 
Ecuador 92.0 78.20 79.57 85.3 55.56 48.5 73.2 15.7 
Finland 96.4 97.67 72.91 66.54 66.1 85.16 63.7 61.9 76.3 13.7 
France 90.7 91.68 87.59 86.23 82.9 82.48 92.0 91.5 88.1 3.70 
Germany 89.8 89.87 78.66 79.8 64.94 79.4 77.5 80.0 7.82 
Greece 90.81 44.44 62.5 90.63 50 67.6 19.7 
Honduras 91.6 95.55 88.86 100.0 81.29 100 96.8 93.4 6.26 
Hong Kong 83.6 85.66 50 85.06 82.0 76.8 71.4 76.3 11.7 
India 67.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.6 100.0 92.7 67.0 90.6 13.8 
Indonesia 99.5 46.88 89.8 71.32 23.2 78.72 50.7 95.6 69.4 25.2 
Ireland 97.8 98.81 100 97.75 98.7 82.8 98.8 97.2 96.4 5.48 
Italy 81.6 78.35 61.21 69.79 72.9 44.09 73.1 80.4 70.2 11.6 
Japan 96.1 97.01 98.47 94.72 97.4 99.2 95.4 97.4 96.9 1.41 
Korea 98.8 98.03 76.91 34.22 92.0 72.21 95.6 97.0 83.1 20.7 
Luexmbourg 95.95 97.67 100 96.68 86.2 95.3 4.74 
Malaysia 98.9 93.93 94.33 83.66 84.2 63.3 91.7 91.9 87.7 10.4 
Mexico 97.7 96.18 100 92.97 92.1 90.7 89.3 94.1 3.63 
Netherlands 72.1 71.17 89.07 93.37 87.4 89.4 82.4 83.5 8.11 
New Zealand 79.4 89.19 94.33 68.80 81.0 90.33 69.4 70.4 80.3 9.51 
Norway 58.5 98 84.2 98.18 95.7 82.8 83.1 93.7 86.7 12.3 
Panama 22.0 100 71.03 72.16 100 100 77.5 27.8 
Peru 52.9 46.22 66.23 17.06 25.5 71.5 23.5 42.5 43.1 18.7 
Philippines 95.2 98.62 64.25 89.1 100 91.9 90.6 89.9 11.1 
Portugal 92.1 100.0 32.69 84.62 100 24.78 90.9 59.3 73.0 28.3 
Singapore 79.9 88.85 98.62 92.36 89.3 96.01 96.3 86.8 91.0 5.72 
Spain 82.1 80.79 86.67 84.24 65.7 95.06 80.2 90.3 83.1 8.11 
Sweden 96.4 96.79 90.07 75.41 77.8 98.23 73.9 79.7 86.0 9.72 
Switzerland 86.0 87.38 89.79 80.73 81.4 69.75 87.7 78.7 82.7 6.10 
Taiwan 98.3 97.84 94.73 98.1 76.39 99.0 93.4 93.9 7.44 
Thailand 93.2 96.98 76.26 97.67 97.7 80.81 80.9 80.1 87.9 8.65 
Turkey 57.8 47.79 90.07 65.7 97.4 75 72.3 17.3 
United 77.3 76.72 95.00 83.28 80.5 97.78 83.1 83.0 84.6 7.25 
Venezuela 89.3 91.57 28.09 55.1 46.43 38.3 58.1 24.2 
mean 81.2 84.63 91.57 77.81 80.0 80.07 80.5 82.4 
S.D. 17.4 16.51 16.44 20.79 17.7 17.76 17.6 13.1 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis of U.S. Commerce Ministry, 1997-2004. 
Table 13 - OLS Regression of Foreign Productions on Present Tax Rates 
Dependent Variable: Log (production) 
Variable OLS (a) OLS (b) OLS (c) 
Tax Rate 4.4452 4.0047 2.968 
(4.34) (3.85) (2.8) 
Log(POP) 0.4091 0.3951 0.3679 
(8.65) (8.32) (7.79) 
log(GDPP) 0.7571 0.7561 0.6767 
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(10.12) (10.16) (8.87) 
Language 0.34673 0.5085 0.5281 
(1.82) (1.99) (2.1) 
Corruption Dummy 0.2986 0.3002 
(2.12) (2.17) 
Tax Rate*Intemal Trade 0.0084 
(3.64) 
Constant -2.2108 -2.1014 -1.3021 
(-2.41) ^ (-1.41) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Dummy Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 340 340 340 
Adjusted R-Square 0.5187 0.5018 0.52 
F value 23.28 22.34 22.6 
Note: The table reports estimates of Equation (1) to (3) from left to right; t value in parentheses. The 
dependent variable in all specifications is the foreign production in log form. Year dummies are 
included in all regressions In addition, the regional-fixed effect is controlled for all specifications. 
Table 14 - OLS Regression of Foreign Productions on Present Tax Rates 
Dependent Variable: Log (production) 
Variable OLS (a) OLS (b) 
Tax Rate 4.4452 3.4127 
(4.34) (3.26) 
Log(POP) 0.4091 0.382 
(8.65) (8.12) 
log(GDPP) 0.7571 0.6778 
(10.12) (8.84) 
Language 0.34673 0.4867 
(1.82) (1.93) 
Tax Rate+Intemal Trade 0.0083 
(3.61) 
Constant -2.2108 -1.4136 
(-2.41) (-1.52) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes 
Regional Dummy ^ ^ 
Number of Observations 340 340 
Adjusted R-Square 0.5187 0.5145 
F-value 23.28 23.45 











Year Dummy Yes 
Regional Dummy Yes 
Number of Observations 300 
F value 18.72 
Adjusted R-Square 0.4535 
Note: t value in parentheses. The dependent variable in all specifications is the foreign production in 
log form. Year dummies are included in all regressions In addition, the regional-fixed effect is 
controlled for all specifications. 
Table 16 OLS Regression of Foreign Productions on One-Year-Before Tax Rate 
Variable Coefficient 








Year Dummy Yes 
Region Dummy Yes 
Number of Observations 297 
F Value 18.44 
Adjusted R-Square 0.4521 
Note: t value in parentheses. The dependent variable in all specifications is the foreign production in 
log form. Year dummies are included in all regressions In addition, the regional-fixed effect is 
controlled for all specifications. 
Table 17 OLS Regression of Foreign Productions on Corruption Dummy A and B 
Variable Coefficient 
Tax Rate 4.11 
(3.86) 
7 2 
Corruption Dummy A -0.17 
(-0.60) 








Year Dummy Yes 
Region Dummy Y ^ 
Number of Observations 338 
F Value 20.96 
Adjusted R-Square 0.5017 
Note: t value in parentheses. The dependent variable in the specification is the foreign production in 
log form. Year dummies are included in all regressions In addition, the regional-fixed effect is 
controlled for all specifications. 
Table 18 OLS Regression of Foreign Productions on Corruption B and C 
Variable Coefficient 
Tax Rate 3.68 
(3.25) 
Corruption Dummy C -0.17 
(-0.63) 








Year Dummy Yes 
Region Dummy 
Number of Observations 335 
F Value 20.25 
Adjusted R-Square 0.4949 
Note: t value in parentheses. The dependent variable in the specification is the foreign production in 
log form. Year dummies are included in all regressions In addition, the regional-fixed effect is 
controlled for all specifications. 
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Table 19 OLS Regression of Tax Rate on Country Dummies 
Variable Coefficient 
Country Dummy 1 -0.01 
(-0.59) 
Country Dummy 2 -0.005 
(-0.3) 
Country Dummy 3 0.04 
(2.45) 
Country Dummy 4 -0.03 
( -1 .49 ) 
Country Dummy 5 0.07 
(4.15) 
Country Dummy 6 _0 • 19 
(11.27) 
Country Dummy 7 -0.02 
(0.89) 
Country Dummy 8 0.005 
(0.3) 
Country Dummy 9 _0-03 
(-1.78) 
Country Dummy 10 -0.1 
(-5.65) 
Country Dummy 11 -0.03 
(-1.69) 
Country Dummy 11 -0.06 
(-3.5) 
Country Dummy 12 0.02 
( -1 .29) 
Country Dummy 13 0.12 
(-7.18) 
Country Dummy 14 0.03 
(-1.97) 
Country Dummy 15 -0.06 
(-3.38) 
Country Dummy 16 -0.18 
(-10.82) 
Country Dummy 17 0.02 
(-1.14) 
Country Dummy 18 -0.03 
(-2.01) 
Country Dummy 19 -0.12 
(-7.06) 
Country Dummy 20 ^.07 
(4.24) 
Country Dummy 21 0.11 
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(6.34) 
Country Dummy 22 -0.04 
(-2.45) 
Country Dummy 23 -0.006 
(-0.35) 
Country Dummy 24 -0.06 
(-3.72) 
Country Dummy 25 -0.001 
(-0.07) 
Country Dummy 26 0.003 
(0.19) 
Country Dummy 27 -0.2 
(-0.89) 
Country Dummy 28 -0.07 
(-3.87) 
Country Dummy 29 0.008 
(0.45) 
Country Dummy 30 -0.05 
(-2.9) 
Country Dummy 31 -0.02 
(-1.04) 
Country Dummy 32 0.006 
(-0.33) 
Country Dummy 33 (-0.1) 
(-5.8) 
Country Dummy 34 0.005 
(0.3) 
Country Dummy 35 -0.07 
(-3.87) 
Country Dummy 36 -0.09 
(-5.38) 
Country Dummy 37 -0.1 
(-5.65) 
Country Dummy 38 -0.5 
(-2.68) 
Country Dummy 39 -0.001 
(-0.07) 
Country Dummy 40 -0.04 
(-2.45) 
Country Dummy 41 -0.005 
(-0.3) 
Country Dummy 42 0.35 
(29.03) 
Number of Observations 344 
F value 27.77 
Adjusted R-Square 0.7662 
Note: t value in parentheses. The dependent variable in the specification is tax rates. 
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